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Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act (CDA) immunizes
“interactive computer services” from most claims arising out of third-
party content posted on the service. Passed in 1996, section 230 is a
vital law for allowing free expression online, but it is ill-suited for
addressing some of the harms that arise in the modern platform-
based economy.
This Article proposes to redefine section 230 immunity for sharing
economy platforms and online marketplaces by tying internet plat-
form immunity to the economic relationship between the platform
and the third party. It primarily focuses on one key flaw of section
230: its binary classification of online actors as either “interactive
computer services” (who are immune under the statute) or “informa-
tion content providers” (who are not immune). This binary classifica-
tion, while perhaps adequate for the internet that existed in 1996,
fails to account for the full range of economic activities in which
modern platforms now engage.
This Article argues that courts applying section 230 should
incorporate joint enterprise liability theory to better define the
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contours of platform immunity. A platform should lose immunity
when there exists a common business purpose, specific pecuniary
interest, and shared right of control in the underlying transaction
giving rise to liability. Sharing economy platforms, such as Airbnb
and Uber, and online marketplaces, such as Amazon, are primary
examples of platforms that may function as joint enterprises. By
using joint enterprise theory to redefine platform immunity, this
Article seeks to promote greater fairness to tort victims while
otherwise retaining section 230’s core free expression purpose.
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INTRODUCTION
Internet platforms are largely immune from liability arising out
of the content they allow third parties to create or share on their
platforms. The source of this immunity is section 230 of the
Communications Decency Act (CDA),1 a 1996 law that is vitally
important but at times too broad. To begin, consider this tale of two
platforms.
In 1995, Craig Newmark set out to create an internet platform for
listing events, jobs, apartments, and other information for local com-
munities seeking to connect with each other.2 His website,
Craigslist.org, initially focused on listing events in the San Fran-
cisco Bay Area but eventually expanded its content to include
housing, jobs, and even goods available for sale.3 Although Craigslist
started as a noncommercial, nonprofit site,4 by 1999, it was
operating as a private, for-profit business with full-time employees.5
It expanded into other cities and, to make revenue, began charging
for some job postings.6 While successful and profitable, Craiglist has
avoided banner ads, subscription fees, and other sources of online
revenue.7
1. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c).




5. Terynn Boulton, Everything You Ever Wanted to Know About Craig from Craigslist,
GIZMODO (Sept. 6, 2013, 5:30 AM), https://gizmodo.com/everything-you-ever-wanted-to-know-
about-craig-from-cra-1262446153 [https://perma.cc/4ES4-LXU9]. Newmark started Craig-
connects in 2011 as an umbrella organization for Craigslist’s philanthropic endeavors,
including supporting organizations that help people through community engagement and
pursuing causes that promote online trust, internet ethics, and accountability. Jon Fine, How
Craigslist’s Founder Realized He Sucked as a Manager, INC. (Sept. 2016), https://www.inc.com/
magazine/201609/jon-fine/inc-interview-craigslist.html [https://perma.cc/LFG8-9U26]. None-
theless, Craiglist also lobbies for legislative and other action. Notably, Craigslist lobbied
against the Stop Enabling Sex Traffickers Act (SESTA) and Allow States and Victims to Fight
Online Sex Trafficking Act (FOSTA) amendments to section 230. See Theodoric Meyer with
Aubree Eliza Weaver, Craigslist Hires First Lobbyists, POLITICO (Dec. 8, 2017, 2:50 PM),
https://www.politico.com/newsletters/politico-influence/2017/12/08/craigslist-hires-first-
lobbyists-046160 [https://perma.cc/NZ9H-GLP6].
6. Boulton, supra note 5.
7. Fine, supra note 5.
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In 2009, Travis Kalanick co-founded UberCab in San Francisco.8
The business concept was somewhat simple: users seeking a ride
could click a button on their smartphones, and a car would appear.9
The vision was for UberCab to be “everyone’s private driver”10—a
much-needed improvement to the highly regulated and entrenched
transportation industry.11 By 2010, Uber started a new genre of
transportation services in a tech-enabled modern sharing economy.12
Sometimes called “transportation network companies,” platforms
such as Uber rely on mobile technology to connect individuals to
each other for the purpose of offering “ridesharing services” to the
public.13 But Uber is not merely a forum for connecting riders with
drivers. It exerts considerable control over transactions that happen
on its platform. For example, in most locations Uber is entirely
cashless;14 the company collects payment from riders directly and
later pays its drivers a portion of the fares.15 Uber sets and enforces
8. Brian O’Connell, History of Uber: Timeline and Facts, THESTREET (Jan. 2, 2020, 12:50
PM), https://www.thestreet.com/technology/history-of-uber-15028611 [https://perma.cc/7Y7M-
BLGK].
9. The History of Uber, UBER NEWSROOM, https://www.uber.com/newsroom/history/
[https://perma.cc/46FL-EQ67].
10. E.g., Felix Salmon, The Economics of “Everyone’s Private Driver,” MEDIUM (June 1,
2014), https://medium.com/@felixsalmon/the-economics-of-everyones-private-driver-
464bfd730b38 [https://perma.cc/M6CK-LQ6M].
11. See Kara Swisher, Man and Uber Man, VANITY FAIR (Nov. 5, 2014),
http://www.vanityfair.com/news/2014/12/uber-travis-kalanick-controversy [https://perma.cc/
QBC6-QXPU] (describing the development of Uber).
12. See id.; see also Agnieszka A. McPeak, Sharing Tort Liability in the New Sharing
Economy, 49 CONN. L. REV. 171, 177-78 (2016) (explaining the evolution of the sharing
economy from a nonmonetized barter system to a tech-enabled, sophisticated system of peer-
to-peer transactions).
13. See CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 5431(c) (West 2019) (“‘Transportation network company’
means an organization ... that provides prearranged transportation services for compensation
using an online-enabled application or platform to connect passengers with drivers using a
personal vehicle.”); Ravi Mahesh, From Jitneys to App-Based Ridesharing: California’s “Third
Way” Approach to Ride-for-Hire Regulation, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 965, 965, 1009 (2015)
(discussing California’s adoption of the transportation network company definition).
14. See Paying with Cash, UBER HELP, https://help.uber.com/riders/article/paying-with-
cash-?nodeId=ba02bcb0-4bdc-417a-a236-8fe1582adffc [https://perma.cc/N8GA-EU8K] (“Uber
is designed to be an entirely cashless experience in most cities.”).
15. See How Do I Receive My Earnings?, UBER HELP, https://help.uber.com/driving-and-
delivering/article/how-do-i-receive-my-earnings?nodeId=42973e65-45a8-4aaf-90d5-
d3e97ab61267 [https://perma.cc/58CP-627C].
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its own prices,16 requires drivers to meet certain safety require-
ments,17 and sets terms and conditions for riders.18
Both Craigslist and Uber are internet-based businesses relying
on web-enabled connections among individual users.19 And both
attempt to shield themselves from liability for claims arising out of
third-party activity on their platforms.20 Section 230 states that
16. See How Are Fares Calculated?, UBERHELP, https://help.uber.com/riders/article/how-
are-fares-calculated?nodeId=d2d43bbc-f4bb-4882-b8bb-4bd8acf03a9d [https://perma.cc/N262-
Z8PP]. Although Uber touts driver flexibility, it has come under fire for its assertions about
how much a driver can really make. See, e.g., Janine Berg & Hannah Johnston, Too Good to
Be True? A Comment on Hall and Krueger’s Analysis of the Labor Market for Uber’s Driver-
Partners, 72 ILRREV. 39, 40, 55, 63-64 (2019). Nonetheless, Uber experimented with allowing
California drivers to set their own fares in response to California legislation that reclassified
some gig workers as employees. See Carolyn Said, Uber, Wary of AB5, Is Giving California
Drivers More Freedom. Its Tactics May Not Work, S.F. CHRON. (Feb. 10, 2020, 9:13 AM),
https://www.sfchronicle.com/business/article/Will-Uber-s-ride- changes-thwart-AB5-gig-work-
15041528.php [https://perma.cc/PTP3-8N39]. But see Shannon Bond, California Voters Give
Uber, Lyft a Win but Some Drivers Aren’t So Sure, NPR (Nov. 5, 2020, 6:01 AM), https://www.
npr.org/2020/11/05/931561150/california-voters-give-uber-lyft-a-win-but-some-drivers-arent-
so-sure [https://perma.cc/GH2E-4VXV] (describing Proposition 22, a successful California bal-
lot measure that allows sharing economy platforms to maintain independent contractor status
for their workers). Moreover, as a company, Uber is highly valued and has raised un-
precedented amounts of venture capital. Ritika Shah, New Investment Round Could Put Uber
Valuation at $62.5 Billion, CNBC (Dec. 3, 2015, 5:34 PM), http://www.cnbc.com/2015/
12/03/uber-to-be-valued-at-more-than-62-billion.html [https://perma.cc/Z6LE-WCDR]; see also
Douglas MacMillan & Telis Demos, Uber Valued at More than $50 Billion, WALL ST. J. (July
31, 2015, 8:50 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/uber-valued-at-more-than-50-billion-14383674
57 [https://perma.cc/EGA6-GHSG] (noting that Uber surpassed Facebook’s venture capital
success as a startup).
17. Safety, UBER, https://www.uber.com/us/en/safety [https://perma.cc/6JGT-M6VJ].
18. U.S. Terms of Use, UBER, https://www.uber.com/legal/usa/terms [https://perma.cc/
C2E4-5FQU].
19. Orly Lobel, The Law of the Platform, 101 MINN. L. REV. 87, 94 (2016) (defining the
platform “as an online intermediary between buyers and sellers of goods and services—the
ancient role of the middleman—enhanced with the modern power afforded by cloud
computing, algorithmic matching, pervasive wireless Internet access, scaled user-networks,
and near-universal customer ownership of smartphones and tablets” but noting that platforms
are also “the new wave of digital companies ... based on the logic of multi-sided markets that
disrupt traditional offline interactions by reshaping the ways individuals transact”); Julie E.
Cohen, Law for the Platform Economy, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 133, 144-45 (2017) (“Platforms
exploit the affordances of network organization and supply infrastructures that facilitate
particular types of interactions, but they also represent strategies for bounding networks and
privatizing and controlling infrastructures.... Platforms [also] use technical protocols and
centralized control to define networked spaces in which users can conduct a heterogeneous
array of activities and to structure those spaces for ease of use.”).
20. See, e.g., HomeAway.com, Inc. v. City of Santa Monica, 918 F.3d 676, 684 (9th Cir.
2019) (affirming district court’s ruling that Airbnb was not immune under section 230);
2021] PLATFORM IMMUNITY REDEFINED 1563
“[n]o provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be
treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by
another information content provider.”21 An “interactive computer
service,” essentially defined as the entity that provides or enables
access to a computer network,22 is immune from liability.23 By
contrast, no immunity attaches for the “information content
provider,”24 that is, the “entity that is responsible, in whole or in
part, for the creation or development of [online] information.”25
Under section 230’s binary classification of “computer service”
and “content provider,” Craigslist and Uber may both appear to fit
the “computer service” category. After all, Craiglist’s forum enables
access to a network of listings, and Uber connects drivers and riders
via its own network. But the core economic activity and business
model of each platform vary considerably. Uber purports to screen
members of its network;26 Craigslist does not. Moreover, Uber takes
a cut of every transaction on its platform.27 While Craigslist charges
fees “for job postings,”28 it does not set prices for the goods and
services available on its platform the way that Uber does.29 These
two platforms fundamentally differ in (1) how they operate, (2) the
degree of control they exert over transactions, and (3) the way they
profit from their users. Quite simply, Craigslist provides a forum for
user-enabled exchanges (and likely deserves broad immunity) while
Uber operates more like a joint enterprise with its drivers (and
should not get the same broad immunity).
These two platforms illustrate the need for a more nuanced
analysis of a platform’s underlying economic activity for the
purposes of determining section 230 immunity. Uber and other
sharing economy platforms—along with online marketplaces such
Adeline A. Allen, Uber and the Communications Decency Act: Why the Ride-Hailing App
Would Not Fare Well Under § 230, 18 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 290 (2017) (describing how Uber
might fare under section 230).
21. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1).
22. Id. § 230(f)(2).
23. Id. § 230(c)(1).
24. See id.
25. Id. § 230(f)(3).
26. See Safety, supra note 17.
27. See How Do I Receive My Earnings?, supra note 15.
28. See Mission and History, supra note 2.
29. See id.; How Are Fares Calculated?, supra note 16.
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as Amazon—challenge the bounds of section 230. While it is
important to protect intermediaries from most liability arising out
of third-party speech and allow them to moderate content,30 section
230 has gone too far in insulating platforms that actively engage in
something resembling a joint enterprise with third parties. This
Article thus proposes that one limit on section 230 immunity should
be based on the nature of the economic relationship between the
platform and third parties.
This reform is necessary because modern platforms have multiple
functions and at times engage in hands-on, for-profit relationships
with users that resemble joint enterprises.31 As actors who control
and profit from transactions, these platforms should bear some of
the cost of harms that flow from their activities.32 By looking at
whether the platform is engaging in a joint enterprise with a user,
the law can rein in overly expansive applications of platform
immunity and permit some remedies to tort victims.33 At the same
time, this approach can promote stability and clarity at a time when
platform immunity is being threatened by sweeping reforms.34
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I examines the development
of platform immunity over time and the current section 230
30. “Content moderation” refers to the platform’s policies for allowing certain content and
blocking other content from its websites. Facebook, for example, uses a series of guidelines
that dictate when nudity, violence, harassment, or other objectionable content should be
excluded from the platform. See Kyle Langvardt, Regulating Online Content Moderation, 106
GEO.L.J. 1353, 1356 (2018); see also Kate Klonick, The New Governors: The People, Rules, and
Processes Governing Online Speech, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1598, 1603 (2018).
31. A “joint enterprise” in tort law often includes a common pecuniary purpose and right
of control. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 491 cmt. c (AM. L. INST. 1965).
32. See generally Gregory C. Keating, The Theory of Enterprise Liability and Common
Law Strict Liability, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1285, 1286-87 (2001) [hereinafter Keating, Theory of
Enterprise Liability]; Alan O. Sykes, The Economics of Vicarious Liability, 93 YALE L.J. 1231,
1235 (1984); Gregory C. Keating, The Idea of Fairness in the Law of Enterprise Liability, 95
MICH. L. REV. 1266, 1267 (1997) [hereinafter Keating, Idea of Fairness].
33. See also Lewis A. Kornhauser, An Economic Analysis of the Choice Between Enterprise
and Personal Liability for Accidents, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 1345, 1380 (1982) (noting that
enterprise liability can promote a higher degree of care).
34. See, e.g., Allow States and Victims to Fight Online Sex Trafficking Act of 2017, Pub.
L. No. 115-164, 132 Stat. 1253 (2018) (amending section 230 to limit immunity for websites
knowingly hosting content facilitating sex trafficking); see also Ending Support for Internet
Censorship Act, S. 1914, 116th Cong. (2019) (proposing to amend federal law to require that
large internet platforms certify to the Federal Trade Commission that their content
moderation practices are politically neutral as a prerequisite for getting section 230
immunity).
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framework. It explores how immunity for internet platforms
emerged due to the practical and normative concerns of imposing
traditional publisher liability on internet companies and how courts
have interpreted section 230 over time. Further, it provides an over-
view of legislative reform proposals and academic literature
supporting and critiquing section 230.
Part II proposes redefining platform immunity using joint
enterprise liability theory in tort law. It begins by explaining joint
enterprise theory generally. It then critiques section 230’s binary
classification of “interactive computer services” and “information
content providers” as insufficient for capturing the range of activ-
ities in which modern platforms now engage. Part II then examines
how sharing economy platforms and online marketplaces in
particular do not fit neatly within section 230’s current framework.
Part II acknowledges that platform immunity under section 230
is appropriate for insulating many online intermediaries from
claims based on third-party content, but it suggests also examining
the economic relationship between the platform and the third-party
content creator to determine the parameters of immunity. Drawing
on joint enterprise liability in tort law, Part II thus concludes by
arguing that section 230 immunity is inappropriate for platforms
that have a common business purpose with the third party, share a
specific pecuniary interest with the third party, and possess an
equal voice or right of control. This approach reconciles a key
purpose behind section 230—insulating online intermediaries from
liability as “speakers” or “publishers” of third-party content35—with
the current reality of the modern platform-based economy. Quite
simply, online intermediaries now take many forms, and platforms
that engage in joint enterprises with third parties should not be
entitled to broad immunity.
I. THE CURRENT SECTION 230 FRAMEWORK
In the 1990s, when the internet was emerging as a personal tool
for communication and commerce, policymakers foresaw the threat
of innovation-crushing civil liability.36 Traditional tort law imposes
35. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)-(c).
36. See generally JEFF KOSSEFF, THE TWENTY-SIX WORDS THAT CREATED THE INTERNET
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liability on publishers for the content they choose to publish.37 Thus,
poor editorial choices that result in harm to others may give rise to
civil liability.38 Even distributors can face tort liability if they know-
ingly distribute defamatory content.39 An internet computer service,
on the other hand, is different in both nature and scope.40 At the
time section 230 was passed, burgeoning new internet companies
were not intending to supplant newspaper publishers or function as
distributors but, instead, were programming software and develop-
ing high-tech tools to allow the “Cyber Age” to explode.41 The
internet they were building had the potential to democratize
communication by giving individual users more freedom to interact
57-77 (2019) (describing the origins of section 230).
37. For example, a cause of action for defamation may arise when an actor publishes a
false or defamatory statement. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 558 (AM.L.INST. 1977)
(explaining elements of a defamation claim). Privacy-based torts may also arise when an actor
unreasonably intrudes upon the seclusion of another, misappropriates someone’s name or
likeness, unreasonably publicizes private facts, or unreasonably places another in a false light
before the public. See id. § 652A (stating the general principles of privacy torts). 
38. See id. §§ 558, 652A (defining the elements of claims for defamation and invasion of
privacy, both of which give rise to civil damages).
39. See Eric Goldman, Why Section 230 Is Better than the First Amendment, 95 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. REFLECTION 33, 38 (2019).
40. Scholars have often referred to “internet exceptionalism,” the idea that cyberspace is
fundamentally different than the real world, both in its location and its primary function or
purpose. See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, Internet Exceptionalism: An Overview from General
Constitutional Law, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1637, 1638 (2015); H. Brian Holland, In Defense
of Online Intermediary Immunity: Facilitating Communities of Modified Exceptionalism, 56
U. KAN. L. REV. 369, 377 (2008) (describing the rationale for self-regulation on the internet);
David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders—The Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48 STAN.
L. REV. 1367, 1395-1400 (1996) (noting the challenges posed by the seemingly boundaryless
space that is the internet); Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Cyberspace Self-Government: Town Hall
Democracy or Rediscovered Royalism?, 12BERKELEY TECH.L.J. 413, 476-78 (1997); Lawrence
Lessig & Paul Resnick, Zoning Speech on the Internet: A Legal and Technical Model, 98 MICH.
L.REV. 395, 396 (1999) (because cyberspace lacks a single jurisdiction, regulation, particularly
of speech, becomes more difficult). But see Meg Leta Jones, Does Technology Drive Law? The
Dilemma of Technological Exceptionalism in Cyberlaw, 2018 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 249,
284 (taking a critical look at the notion of technological exceptionalism); Abbey Stemler,
Platform Advocacy and the Threat to Deliberative Democracy, 78 MD. L. REV. 105, 146 (2018)
(noting how platform regulation may be necessary in light of advocacy roles by platforms).
41. Courts have recognized that the “Cyber Age” is a revolutionary point in time, with
broad implications on free speech and expression. See, e.g., Packingham v. North Carolina,
137 S. Ct. 1730, 1736 (2017) (“While we now may be coming to the realization that the Cyber
Age is a revolution of historic proportions, we cannot appreciate yet its full dimensions and
vast potential to alter how we think, express ourselves, and define who we want to be. The
forces and directions of the Internet are so new, so protean, and so far reaching that courts
must be conscious that what they say today might be obsolete tomorrow.”).
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with each other directly through online forums.42 Some internet
platforms established norms for online conduct while others did
not.43 Either way, platforms served primarily as intermediaries, not
as traditional editors or even newsstands.44 Thus, policymakers in
the 1990s recognized the threat that liability posed to the growth
and promise of the internet and enacted section 230 of the Commu-
nications Decency Act in 1996.45
By passing section 230, Congress sought to prevent state and
federal laws from over-regulating the internet.46 In 1996, as the
“DotCom” industry flourished,47 concerns arose about the stifling
42. See, e.g., Klonick, supra note 30, at 1603-04.
43. See Christopher Cox, The Origins and Original Intent of Section 230 of the
Communications Decency Act, U. RICH. J.L. & TECH. BLOG ¶¶ 26-27 (Aug. 27, 2020),
https://jolt.richmond.edu/2020/08/27/the-origins-and-original-intent-of-section-230-of-the-
communications-decency-act/ [https://perma.cc/4UY2-SKF8] (discussing the content guidelines
in Stratton Oakmont v. Prodigy Servs. Co., No. 031063/94, 1995 WL 323710 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
May 24, 1995), in comparison to the lack of guidelines in Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc., 776
F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1991)). See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles,
96 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 914-15 (1996) (“If a definition is thought necessary, we might, very
roughly, understand ‘norms’ to be social attitudes of approval and disapproval, specifying
what ought to be done and what ought not to be done.... Social norms may or may not promote
liberty and well-being; they may or may not be easily malleable or go very deep into people’s
understandings.”). While some social norms are affirmatively codified in enacted law, social
norms may also exist outside of the law and are instead enforced through social sanctions by
other members of a social group. Id. at 915. On the internet, social norms may be set by users
of a platform, but they may also be enforced by the very architecture of the platform being
used. See Mark A. Lemley, The Law and Economics of Internet Norms, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
1257, 1287 (1998). 
44. See Cox, supra note 43, ¶ 14 (“Above all, the internet was unique in that
communications were instantaneous: the content creators could interact with the entire
planet without any intermediation or any lag time. In order for censors to intervene, they
would have to destroy the real-time feature of the technology that made it so useful.”).
45. See Holland, supra note 40, at 372-73. Section 230 immunity applies to tort, statutory,
and other liability and preempts state law. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c), (e)(3). Exceptions to section
230 include federal criminal law, federal intellectual property law, and, most recently, state
criminal laws designed to combat sex trafficking. See id. § 230(e). Although a plaintiff may
proceed against the third-party content creator directly, anonymity online complicates such
claims. See Bryan H. Choi, The Anonymous Internet, 72 MD.L.REV. 501, 529-30 (2013) (noting
how difficult it can be to sue third-party content providers).
46. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(2); see also id. § 230(f)(1) (defining “Internet” as “the inter-
national computer network of both Federal and non-Federal interoperable packet switched
data networks”).
47. See, e.g., Jason Murdock, The Dotcom Bubble Crash Was 20 Years Ago Today—Could
It Happen Again?, NEWSWEEK (Mar. 10, 2020, 12:14 PM), https://www.newsweek.com/dotcom-
bubble-crash-20-anniversary-technology-companies-ever-happen-again-1491385
[https://perma.cc/J5G4-XYXJ] (“In the mid-to-late 1990s, as access to the World Wide Web
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effect of broad civil liability on the internet’s growth.48 Lawmakers
worried that civil lawsuits could extinguish the internet as a forum
for free expression, particularly in its infancy.49 One of the primary
functions of section 230 is to allow for content moderation by plat-
forms by insulating them from tort liability when they voluntarily
restrict objectionable content.50 It is designed to let users share
openly and maintain some control over free expression online.51 But
section 230’s reach is much broader, potentially extending into real-
world commercial relationships in the sharing economy and online
marketplaces.52
One pair of cases from the 1990s illustrates the problem that
Congress sought to fix with the passage of section 230: Cubby, Inc.
v. CompuServe Inc.53 and Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Services
Co.54 In both cases, the plaintiffs sued internet platforms for
allegedly defamatory postings by third parties on the platforms’
message boards. In the CompuServe case, no liability attached to a
message board operator because it did not moderate content or
otherwise attempt to remove improper materials.55 But in Prodigy,
became more common around the world, all eyes turned to internet-based companies as the
future of commerce, leading to excessive market speculation, reckless ‘fad’ investments and
an intense focus on marketing over substance. Loose wallets and the desire to grow startups
extremely fast helped to fuel the boom, pushing the Nasdaq to an all-time high of 5132.52 on
March 10, 2000.”).
48. See Cox, supra note 43, ¶¶ 20-28. Section 230(b) lays out the policies underlying the
statute’s immunity provisions, including the need to continue development of the internet as
a free-speech center, to allow for competition in the marketplace, to facilitate user control over
online activity, and to permit online services to moderate offensive content without fear of
liability. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(b).
49. See Cox, supra note 43, ¶ 23 (discussing how the two main cosponsors of what became
section 230 were crafting legislation “that would bar federal regulation of the internet and
help parents find ways to block material they found objectionable” (quoting Cyberporn—On
a Screen Near You, TIME, July 3, 1995, at 38)).
50. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2). Section 230(c) is titled “Protection for ‘Good Samaritan’ blocking
and screening of offensive material.” Id. § 230(c).
51. See id. § 230(b) (describing policy rationales for section 230, including enabling more
user control).
52. See infra Part II.B-C.
53. 776 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
54. No. 031063/94, 1995 WL 323710 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995).
55. 776 F. Supp. at 140-41. The CompuServe case involved a message board called
Rumorville on which allegedly defamatory content was posted about a competing gossip
website, Skuttlebut, and its founders. Id. at 137-38. A third party uploaded the Rumorville
content and CompuServe allowed its display almost instantaneously with no editorial
discretion. Id. at 140 & n.1. The court held that CompuServe functioned more like a library
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a similar computer service was liable because of its efforts to keep
some offensive content off its message boards.56 These cases thus
illustrate the defamation law origins of section 230 and the perverse
results that can flow without section 230’s enactment.57
CompuServe and Prodigy supported the perverse result that
interactive computer services faced greater liability if they made an
effort to police offensive content because an imperfect attempt to
filter offensive content would give rise to publisher-based defama-
tion claims.58 These cases serve as important examples of why
traditional publisher liability on the internet is not desirable. What
or bookseller, and thus was a distributor that could be liable only if it knew of the defamatory
content. See id. at 140. Because plaintiffs set forth no allegations that CompuServe had the
requisite knowledge for distributor liability to attach, the claims were dismissed on summary
judgment. Id. at 141. The court held that CompuServe was not a publisher but a mere
distributor that was not liable because it did not know, nor did it have reason to know, about
the defamatory posts. See id.
56. 1995 WL 323710, at *5. Prodigy involved an online computer service facing liability
as a publisher of defamatory content because it tried to curtail offensive speech on its forums.
Id. A user of the defendant company’s “Money Talk” forum posted disparaging comments
about Stratton Oakmont, an investment firm. Id. at *1. The defamatory statements included
an allegation that Stratton Oakmont’s “president ... committed criminal and fraudulent acts
in connection with the initial public offering of stock” that was a “major criminal fraud” and
“100% criminal fraud.” Id. The statements also alleged the president was “soon to be proven
criminal” and that the firm was a “cult of brokers who either lie for a living or get fired.” Id.
The court held that Prodigy was liable as the publisher of the defamatory content on its
bulletin board because Prodigy used “Board Leaders” to moderate content and selectively
filtered out some offensive content through software tools, but it failed to remove the
defamatory posts at issue. Id. at *4. Prodigy argued that, with over sixty thousand posts a
day, it could not perform editorial functions for all messages posted and should not be held
responsible for any third-party content. Id. at *3. The court rejected Prodigy’s arguments,
holding it liable for the defamatory posts it failed to filter. Id. at *5. Thus, Prodigy exposed
itself to liability because it tried to do the right thing, that is, to keep its message boards
family-friendly by removing offensive or illegal content—albeit not doing a perfect job at it.
See id.
57. See Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d
1157, 1163 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (explaining that the Prodigy case inspired section 230).
58. As the court noted in the Prodigy case, the defendant platform’s “conscious choice, to
gain the benefits of editorial control, has opened it up to a greater liability than CompuServe
and other computer networks that make no such choice.” 1995 WL 323710, at *5. The court
acknowledged that its opinion may disincentivize responsible content moderation but noted
that Prodigy’s choice to be a “family-oriented” place online would presumably expand its
market and attract more users. Id. Thus, Prodigy needed to face the legal consequences that
flowed from its decision. Id.
1570 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62:1557
followed was passage of section 230 and subsequent expansion by
judicial interpretations of its scope.59
A. Overview of Section 230
Section 230 begins by laying out the congressional findings that
inspired broad immunity for computer services.60 First, the statute
notes that the internet provides an array of “services available to
individual Americans,” marking an “extraordinary advance” in
citizens’ access to information and resources.61 Additionally, internet
services give users control and provide a forum for discourse and
“myriad avenues for intellectual activity.”62 And, although still new,
the internet thus far had flourished with minimal government
intervention as people increasingly relied on it.63
In addition to these stated findings, the statute articulates the
key U.S. policies that underlie it.64 These policies include promoting
further development of online services and “preserv[ing] the vibrant
and competitive free market that presently exists for the Internet”
without constraint by state or federal law.65
Notably, section 230 expressly contemplates selective content
moderation by platforms. In particular, one of its stated policies is
“to encourage the development of technologies which maximize user
control over what information is received by individuals, families,
and schools who use the Internet and other interactive computer
services.”66 In this way, the statute recognizes that a free and open
internet will necessarily include offensive or undesirable content,
59. The Communications Decency Act itself was a broad statute intended to protect
children from offensive or pornographic material online. See Communications Decency Act of
1996, Pub. L. 104-104, 110 Stat. 133. The statute was largely struck down as unconstitutional.
See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 874 (1997). Section 230, however, remains valid law. See 47
U.S.C. § 230.
60. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(a).
61. Id. § 230(a)(1).
62. Id. § 230(a)(2)-(3).
63. Id. § 230(a)(4)-(5).
64. See id. § 230(b).
65. Id. § 230(b)(1)-(2).
66. Id. § 230(b)(3).
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and platforms should be free to selectively curate content and create
user controls without fear of liability.67
Not all types of claims are immune under section 230. Rather,
section 230 carves out federal criminal law and intellectual property
claims.68 And, most recently, Congress passed legislation amending
section 230 to allow for the enforcement of state laws aimed at
stopping sex trafficking.69 But, aside from these limitations, section
230 applies to a broad range of claims and is not limited to cases
involving speech-based torts, such as defamation.
Section 230’s most cited immunity provision is titled “Protection
for ‘Good Samaritan’ blocking and screening of offensive material.”70
It distinguishes between the provider of content and the computer
service that hosts it. It also expressly allows for restricting offensive
content. Specifically, it states:
(1) Treatment of publisher or speaker
No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall
be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information
provided by another information content provider.
(2) Civil liability
No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall
be held liable on account of—
(A) any action voluntarily taken in good faith to
restrict access to or availability of material that the
provider or user considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivi-
ous, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or other-
wise objectionable, whether or not such material is
constitutionally protected; or 
(B) any action taken to enable or make available to
information content providers or others the technical
67. See id. § 230(b). The private sector’s lead role in moderating online content, however,
is not without its own controversy and free speech concern. See Langvardt, supra note 30, at
1358 (cautioning against entrusting free speech rights solely to private-sector self-regulation);
Kristine L. Gallardo, Note, Taming the Internet Pitchfork Mob: Online Public Shaming, the
Viral Media Age, and the Communications Decency Act, 19 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 721, 741
(2017) (suggesting that platforms use section 230 as a shield so that they may warn users of
the dangers of online public shaming through their design and choice of architecture).
68. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(1)-(2).
69. See Allow States and Victims to Fight Online Sex Trafficking Act of 2017, Pub. L. No.
115-164, 132 Stat. 1253 (2018) (amending section 230 to limit immunity for websites
knowingly hosting content that facilitates sex trafficking).
70. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c).
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means to restrict access to material described in
paragraph (1).71
Stated otherwise, immunity hinges on whether a company is a
computer service or a content provider, as only the “interactive
computer service” is afforded immunity.72
The definitions of these terms thus become crucial. Interactive
computer services enable computer access to a server.73 Domain-
name registrars,74 search engines,75 website hosting services,76 some
online marketplaces,77 message board operators,78 and internet
service providers79 have been classified as computer services. By
contrast, an information content provider is responsible for creating
and developing information.80 Content providers generally are not
immune under section 230.81 To determine if a platform is a content
provider, courts conduct a fact-specific inquiry into the nature of the
71. Id.
72. See id.
73. The statute defines “interactive computer service” as “any information service, system,
or access software provider that provides or enables computer access by multiple users to a
computer server, including specifically a service or system that provides access to the Internet
and such systems operated or services offered by libraries or educational institutions.” Id.
§ 230(f)(2).
74. See, e.g., Smith v. Intercosmos Media Grp., Inc., No. Civ.A. 02-1964, 2002 WL
31844907, at *1, *3 (E.D. La. Dec. 17, 2002).
75. Parker v. Google, Inc., 242 F. App’x 833, 836-38 (3d Cir. 2007) (holding that a search
engine was not liable for including defamatory content or content protected by intellectual
property rights).
76. See, e.g., Ricci v. Teamsters Union Loc. 456, 781 F.3d 25, 26 (2015).
77. See, e.g., Schneider v. Amazon.com, Inc., 31 P.3d 37, 38-39, 43 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001)
(holding that an online book merchant was not liable for allowing negative author reviews
despite a take-down request).
78. See, e.g., Universal Commc’n Sys., Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d 413, 415 (1st Cir. 2007)
(holding that a message board operator was not responsible for defamatory content posted by
an anonymous third-party user).
79. See, e.g., Noah v. AOL Time Warner Inc., 261 F. Supp. 2d 532, 538 (E.D. Va. 2003)
(holding that an ISP that provides its subscribers with access to public chatrooms qualified
as an information service that provided multiple people with internet access), aff’d, No. 03-
1770, 2004 WL 602711 (4th Cir. 2004).
80. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3) (defining “information content provider” as “any person or
entity that is responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or development of information
provided through the Internet or any other interactive computer service”).
81. See id. § 230(c).
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company’s activity to assess whether the company created or
developed the problematic content.82
In addition to section 230’s classification of online actors into only
two binary categories, a key feature of the statute is its reliance on
defamation law concepts in its framework. Under tort law, a cause
of action for defamation may arise when an actor publishes a false
or defamatory statement.83 “Publication” for the purposes of
defamation simply means communication to someone else, whether
done intentionally or negligently, verbally or in print.84 “A communi-
cation is defamatory if it tends so to harm the reputation of another
as to lower him in the estimation of the community or to deter third
persons from associating or dealing with him.”85 Thus, a claim for
defamation requires a false and defamatory statement,86 un-
privileged publication of the statement, negligence or greater fault,87
and sometimes a showing of special harm.88 Not only is the person
who publishes the defamatory statement potentially liable, distribu-
tors can also be liable if they intentionally fail to remove defamatory
content in their possession or control.89
82. See, e.g., FTC v. LeadClick Media, LLC, 838 F.3d 158, 174 (2d Cir. 2016) (“A defendant
... will not be held responsible [as an information content provider] unless it assisted in the
development of what made the content unlawful.”); FTC v. Accusearch Inc., 570 F.3d 1187,
1199 (10th Cir. 2009) (“[T]o be ‘responsible’ for the development of offensive content, one must
be more than a neutral conduit for that content. That is, one is not ‘responsible’ for the
development of offensive content if one’s conduct was neutral with respect to the offensiveness
of the content (as would be the case with the typical Internet bulletin board). We would not
ordinarily say that one who builds a highway is ‘responsible’ for the use of that highway by
a fleeing bank robber, even though the culprit's escape was facilitated by the availability of
the highway.”).
83. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 558 (AM. L. INST. 1977) (explaining the
elements of a defamation claim).
84. See id. § 577 & cmt. a.
85. See id. § 559.
86. Statements of fact that are true do not give rise to liability for defamation. Id. § 581A
& cmt. a.
87. For private matters pertaining to private persons, only negligence must be shown to
be liable for defamation. See id. § 580B. For public officials or figures, the publication of a
false and defamatory communication must be done recklessly or intentionally to give rise to
liability. See id. § 580A.
88. See id. § 558 (defamation elements); see also, e.g., id. §§ 569-70, 575, 620-22 (various
special harm provisions).
89. See id. § 577(2) (“One who intentionally or unreasonably fails to remove defamatory
matter that he knows to be exhibited on land or chattels in his possession or under his control
is subject to liability for its continued publication.”).
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Section 230 expressly states that a computer service is not to be
treated as a “speaker” or “publisher” of third-party content.90 In
other words, section 230 narrowly homes in on the role of the
speaker, publisher, or distributor in the traditional defamation law
context and expressly carves out interactive computer services from
liability for defamation. Given that section 230 was preceded by the
defamation cases of CompuServe and Prodigy, it only makes sense
that section 230 structures its immunity on these defamation law
principles.
Even though section 230 originated from defamation law princi-
ples, cases applying it are notable for their expansive interpretation,
with some limitations carved out over time.
1. Key Cases Interpreting Section 230
Section 230 has been broadly interpreted and applied since its
inception. One of the earliest cases interpreting section 230 resulted
in broad statutory construction of platform immunity. In Zeran v.
America Online, Inc., Ken Zeran brought defamation and related
claims against AOL after an anonymous user posted a fake and
offensive t-shirt ad on an AOL bulletin board.91 The fake ad included
Zeran’s phone number and resulted in angry phone calls and major
disruption to his business.92 Zeran sued AOL for negligence based
on AOL’s alleged unreasonable delay in removing a third party’s
defamatory messages, failure to post retractions, and failure to
prevent future, similar messages from being posted on AOL’s
message boards.93 He argued that, at the very least, AOL should
90. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1).
91. 129 F.3d 327, 329 (4th Cir. 1997). The court explained that, in addition to electronic
mailboxes for private messages, AOL subscribers had access to a community electronic
message board, or “bulletin board,” on which other AOL subscribers could post and interact
with each other. Id.
92. Id. The calls included death threats, and their frequency amounted to about one every
two minutes. Id. The fake and offensive t-shirts related to the Oklahoma City bombing, and,
at one point, an Oklahoma City radio station read an AOL message on air, urging listeners
to call Zeran to complain. Id. On the same day as the first fake ad posted, Zeran contacted
AOL and was told that the fake ad would be taken down but that no retraction would be
posted per company policy. Id. The ads kept appearing, and, as the calls intensified, Zeran
repeatedly asked AOL to stop the fake ads. Id.
93. Id. at 328. See generally Eric Goldman, Who Cyber-Attacked Ken Zeran, and Why?
(Santa Clara Univ. Sch. of L. Legal Stud. Rsch. Papers Series, No. 2017-18), https://papers.
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have been liable as a distributer of defamatory content, thereby
responsible for taking down the posts once on notice.94 The trial
court held that section 230 barred Zeran’s claims, and the Fourth
Circuit affirmed.95 First, the court easily classified AOL as an inter-
active computer service because it allowed subscribers to access the
internet and stored a network of information created by sub-
scribers.96 Second, the court looked at the plain language of section
230 and concluded that it created federal immunity to any claim in
which a computer service is to be liable for third-party content.97
Third, the court cited the purpose of section 230, noting the goals of
promoting discourse and facilitating industry growth with minimal
interference.98 Relatedly, the court also pointed out that the statute
encourages computer services to self-regulate and remove offensive
content without fear of liability.99 The result is an early, broad
interpretation of section 230 that helped shape the course of section
230 jurisprudence in the two decades that followed.100
Courts have continued to apply section 230 broadly. Early social
networking website MySpace.com was immune from a lawsuit
alleging that it failed to sufficiently protect a thirteen-year-old girl
from being contacted on the website and later assaulted.101 Section
230 immunized Craigslist.org for discriminatory housing posts made
on its site.102 The statute also immunized Backpage.com in sex
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3079234 [https://perma.cc/NRQ2-GDG3] (speculating
on who may have been the culprit attacking Zeran online).
94. Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330, 332. Notably, the third party or parties who posted the
defamatory messages themselves were never sued because Zeran could not figure out their
identity. Id. at 329 & n.1.
95. Id. at 328.
96. Id. at 329.
97. Id. at 330.
98. Id. Lastly, the Zeran court noted that the anonymous third party who created the
content was not immune from tort liability. Id. Although online harassment is a concern, the
court stated that “Congress made a policy choice ... not to deter harmful online speech through
the separate route of imposing tort liability on companies that serve as intermediaries for
other parties’ potentially injurious messages.” Id. at 330-31.
99. Id. at 331.
100. See Eric Goldman, The Ten Most Important Section 230 Rulings, 20 TUL. J. TECH. &
INTELL.PROP. 1, 3 (2017) (“Two decades later, Zeran remains the seminal Section 230 opinion,
and it has been cited in hundreds of other cases.”).
101. Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 528 F.3d 413, 420 (5th Cir. 2008).
102. Chi. Laws.’ Comm. for C.R. Under L., Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc., 519 F.3d 666, 672 (7th
Cir. 2008).
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trafficking claims because the claims arose from the website’s
regulation of third-party content.103
In addition to immunizing platforms from direct liability, section
230 has also been used to block court orders for a platform to take
down content. In Hassell v. Bird, the court held that Yelp.com, as a
nonparty to a lawsuit, could not be forced to remove a defamatory
review via an injunction.104 In Batzel v. Smith, a website operator
decided to edit and post to a listserv an email alleging that the
plaintiff was related to an especially infamous Nazi and was in
possession of stolen art.105 After the plaintiff sued for reputational
and other harm, the court held that the website operator remained
an interactive computer service despite the alteration of the email
and decision to post it.106 Similarly, in Kimzey v. Yelp Inc., a
website’s star rating system that collected specific user content did
not transform an interactive computer service into a developer of
false information.107 In a more recent case, section 230 immunized
a dating app that facilitated stalking and harassment through its
intentional platform design decisions.108 It has also immunized
103. See Jane Doe No. 1 v. Backpage.com, LLC, 817 F.3d 12, 22 (1st Cir. 2016).
104. 420 P.3d 776, 778, 793 (Cal. 2018). Similarly, in Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., the court held
that section 230 barred negligence claims against a search engine for failing to remove nude
photographs of the plaintiff that were posted by her ex-boyfriend. 570 F.3d 1096, 1102 (9th
Cir. 2009). However, the Barnes court allowed a claim for promissory estoppel to proceed
based on Yahoo’s promise to the plaintiff to remove the content. Id. at 1106, 1109. The
estoppel claim was not based on any editorial function by Yahoo and was thus not barred by
section 230. See id. at 1107. Barnes ultimately articulated a three-part test to determine
whether a platform is immune under section 230(c)(1). A platform is immune when it is “(1)
a provider or user of an interactive computer service (2) whom a plaintiff seeks to treat, under
a state law cause of action, as a publisher or speaker (3) of information provided by another
information content provider.” Id. at 1100-01 (footnote omitted).
105. 333 F.3d 1018, 1020-22 (9th Cir. 2003). The plaintiff ’s building contractor emailed the
website operator after being in the plaintiff ’s home and becoming suspicious. See id.
106. Id. at 1022, 1031.
107. 21 F. Supp. 3d 1120, 1123 (W.D. Wash. 2014), aff’d, 836 F.3d 1263 (9th Cir. 2016)
(“Indeed, Yelp’s star rating program is similar to eBay’s color-coded star rating system that
the Ninth Circuit analogized in holding that classifying user characteristics into discrete
categories and collecting responses to specific essay questions does not transform an
interactive computer service into a developer of the underlying misinformation.”).
108. See Herrick v. Grindr, LLC, 306 F. Supp. 3d 579, 584 (S.D.N.Y. 2018), aff’d, 765 F.
App’x 586 (2d Cir. 2019). In Herrick, a federal trial court held that a dating app was immune
under section 230 when a victim of severe harassment facilitated by the app sued the app and
its parent companies. Id. The court focused on the notion that the claims sought to hold the
app liable as “publisher” of third-party content and dismissed failure to warn and other
claims. See id. at 588-601. But the plaintiff alleged a defective product design—Grindr’s
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social media platforms in cases involving new technology such as
algorithmic matching.109
While Zeran and other cases illustrate the breadth of section 230
immunity, some limitations also exist. In Fair Housing Council of
San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, the court recognized
that a platform can be held liable as a content provider when it
creates or develops the purportedly illegal content.110
Roommates.com involved an online forum for people seeking
roommates and featured a web form that required users to disclose
demographic information, such as sex, sexual orientation, and
family status, before they could search the website or post a
listing.111 The web form also included an optional “[a]dditional
[c]omments” field.112 The plaintiff brought claims under the federal
Fair Housing Act and related state laws, alleging that
Roommates.com forced users to disclose protected characteristics
that would be illegal if used for housing decisions in any other
context.113 The appellate court held that section 230 did not bar
claims arising out of the forced disclosure of protected information
in Roommates.com’s web form because it helped “develop unlawful
content, and thus f[ell] within the exception to section 230, if it
contribute[d] materially to the alleged illegality of the conduct.”114
geolocation features, inability to block and prevent spoofing, and lack of safety features—as
a basis for the claim. Id. at 585. Nonetheless, the court noted that the claims essentially arose
out of third-party use of the app to stalk, harass, and cause other harms, and not something
the platform did. See id. at 593-94.
109. Force v. Facebook, Inc., 934 F.3d 53, 65-66 (2d Cir. 2019) (rejecting claims arising out
of Facebook’s purported support of terrorism and making clear that algorithmic matching does
not change the analysis for section 230 immunity); see also, e.g., Dyroff v. Ultimate Software
Grp., Inc., 934 F.3d 1093, 1095-96 (9th Cir. 2019) (holding that section 230 immunized a social
networking platform from negligence and collusion claims arising out of death following a
drug deal transacted among the platform’s users, after an algorithm helped specifically
connect the drug dealer and the decedent).
110. 521 F.3d 1157, 1166-67 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc).
111. See id. at 1161.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 1162-63 (“A website operator can be both a service provider and a content
provider: If it passively displays content that is created entirely by third parties, then it is
only a service provider with respect to that content. But as to content that it creates itself, or
is ‘responsible, in whole or in part’ for creating or developing, the website is also a content
provider. Thus, a website may be immune from liability for some of the content it displays to
the public but be subject to liability for other content.”).
114. Id. at 1167-68.
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However, any claims arising out of the “[a]dditional [c]omments”
field were barred under section 230 because the descriptions in this
field were optional and did not encourage discriminatory
practices.115
Other courts after Roommates.com have found section 230 did not
bar certain claims against apps or websites. In Federal Trade
Commission v. Accusearch Inc., the court held that section 230 did
not immunize Accusearch, which operated a website that sold
personal data, from unfair-practice claims because its “researchers”
violated confidentiality or privacy statutes in the methods they
employed.116 In Doe v. Internet Brands, Inc., section 230 did not bar
failure to warn claims under California law after an aspiring model
was lured to a fake audition through the defendant’s “Model
Mayhem” social networking site and later assaulted.117 In Maynard
v. Snapchat, Inc., Snapchat was not immune under section 230 after
the plaintiff was injured in a car accident that occurred when a
driver was using the app’s “Speed Filter” feature because no third-
party user content was published in the case.118 In the online
115. Id. at 1174. Although the Ninth Circuit allowed the claims to proceed, it later
determined that Roommates.com was not liable for violating the Fair Housing Act. See Fair
Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommate.com, LLC, 666 F.3d 1216, 1222 (9th Cir.
2012) (“Because we find that the FHA doesn’t apply to the sharing of living units, it follows
that it’s not unlawful to discriminate in selecting a roommate. As the underlying conduct is
not unlawful, Roommate’s facilitation of discriminatory roommate searches does not violate
the FHA.”).
116. 570 F.3d 1187, 1201 (10th Cir. 2009). Accusearch would get a request from a customer,
forward the request to the researcher, charge the customer, and pay the researcher a share
after the work was completed. Id. at 1191. The customer’s interaction occurred directly with
Accusearch, although website boilerplate language disclosed the use of third-party
researchers. Id. The court held that section 230 did not apply because Accusearch was
responsible, at least in part, for developing the illegal content. Id. at 1201.
117. 824 F.3d 846, 849 (9th Cir. 2016). The plaintiff alleged that Internet Brands had
actual knowledge that its Model Mayhem site was being used by perpetrators to lure victims
using fake profiles. Id. The court noted that Internet Brands was an “interactive computer
service,” but it was not being treated as a “publisher” of third-party content for the purposes
of determining liability for failure to warn. Id. at 852. The court seemed to accept the
plaintiff’s theory as one arising out of a special relationship in tort law, thus placing it outside
of the scope of section 230 immunity. Id. (“Jane Doe’s failure to warn claim has nothing to do
with Internet Brands’ efforts, or lack thereof, to edit, monitor, or remove user generated
content. Plaintiff’s theory is that Internet Brands should be held liable, based on its
knowledge of the rape scheme and its ‘special relationship’ with users like Jane Doe, for
failing to generate its own warning. Thus, liability would not discourage the core policy of
section 230(c), ‘Good Samaritan’ filtering of third party content.”).
118. 816 S.E.2d 77, 78-79 (Ga. Ct. App. 2018). According to the plaintiffs, Snapchat’s
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marketplace context, Amazon was not immune under section 230
because the provision “protects interactive computer service pro-
viders from liability as a publisher of speech, ... not ... from liability
as the seller of a defective product.”119 These cases show that some
limitations to section 230’s broad reach exist.
2. Legislative Reform Proposals 
Section 230’s protections remain strong despite some erosion by
courts. But its broad immunity is increasingly being criticized by
politicians. Several reform proposals loom, largely arising out of a
perceived political bias against conservatives by large platforms. For
example, the Ending Support for Internet Censorship Act (ESICA)
would end “automatic” immunity for large internet platforms and
empower the Federal Trade Commission to audit a platform’s
content-removal practices, including its algorithms, to ensure that
they are “politically neutral.”120
“Speed Filter” encouraged and facilitated unsafe driving, and Snapchat knew its users would
be distracted and disobey safety rules while using the feature. Id. at 79. The court below
granted Snapchat’s motion to dismiss on section 230 grounds, but the appellate court
reversed. Id. at 81. The appellate court held that Snapchat was not entitled to section 230
immunity because the published content arose out of Snapchat’s own content—the speed filter
itself—and not content created or posted by third parties. Id. But see Lemmon v. Snap, Inc.,
440 F. Supp. 3d 1103, 1113 (C.D. Cal. 2020) (holding that section 230 immunized Snapchat
from claims arising out of the speed filter feature).
119. Erie Ins. Co. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 925 F.3d 135, 140 (4th Cir. 2019). Nonetheless, the
Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment that Amazon was not liable because the
company did not fit the statutory definition of a “seller” under state law. Id. at 144.
120. Ending Support for Internet Censorship Act, S. 1914, 116th Cong. (2019). Initial
reaction to ESICA has prompted strong outcries against the amendment. See Academics, Civil
Society Caution Lawmakers Considering Amending Section 230, TECHFREEDOM (July 11,
2019), https://techfreedom.org/academics-civil-society-caution-lawmakers-considering-
amending-section-230/ [https://perma.cc/M7G7-AVFB] (compiling statements from experts
criticizing the amendment). A consortium of academics, civil society organizations, and other
legal experts have signed on to a set of principles that policymakers should abide by when
considering section 230 reforms, noting the importance of maintaining strong platform
immunity. Liability for User-Generated Content Online, Principles for Lawmakers, SANTA
CLARA L. DIGIT. COMMONS (July 11, 2019), https://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/cgi/viewcon
tent.cgi?article=2992&context=historical [https://perma.cc/9SEL-FAMG]. But at least two
commentators have supported the amendment. See Adam Candeub & Jeremy Carl, Why
Hawley’s Bill Is the Right Tool to Fight Big Tech’s Censorship of Conservatives, FEDERALIST
(July 9, 2019), https://thefederalist.com/2019/07/09/hawleys-bill-right-tool-fight-big-techs-
censorship-conservatives/ [https://perma.cc/27GM-74X6].
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The Eliminating Abusive and Rampant Neglect of Interactive
Technologies (EARN IT) Act of 2020 would have removed section
230 protections from platforms that host child pornography, with
particular implications for a platform’s use of encryption.121 The
Stop the Censorship Act sought to deter platforms from removing
legal content by barring section 230 immunity if they removed
merely “objectionable” content.122 Finally, the Protecting Local
Authority and Neighborhoods (PLAN) Act would have removed
section 230 immunity for Airbnb and other homesharing platforms
when they facilitate the violation of a lease or state law and fail to
remove the listing within thirty days of receiving notice of the
violation.123
The executive branch has also taken aim at social media plat-
forms, with former President Donald Trump attempting to reform
platform immunity via executive order,124 or through political
pressure and veto power.125 Prominent Democrats have also spoken
out about the need for section 230 reform to combat misinformation,
hate speech, and illegal activity online.126 The calls for reform by the
121. Eliminating Abusive and Rampant Neglect of Interactive Technologies Act of 2020,
S. 3398, 116th Cong.; see also Cristiano Lima, Senate Judiciary Vote Adds Momentum to
Attack on Tech’s Legal Shield, POLITICO (July 2, 2020, 12:49 PM), https://www.politico.com/
news/2020/07/02/tech-liability-protections-child-porn-348142 [https://perma.cc/2TZM-VMLU].
122. Stop the Censorship Act, H.R. 4027, 116th Cong. (2019).
123. Protecting Local Authority and Neighborhoods Act, H.R. 4232, 116th Cong. (2019).
124. Exec. Order No. 13,925, 85 Fed. Reg. 34,079 (May 28, 2020); see also Remarks at a
Presidential Social Media Summit, 2019 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 468, at 13 (July 11, 2019)
(announcing the Trump administration’s exploration of “regulatory and legislative solutions
to protect free speech and the free speech rights of all Americans”); Bobby Allyn, Stung by
Twitter, Trump Signs Executive Order to Weaken Social Media Companies, NPR (May 28,
2020, 9:00 PM), https://www.npr.org/2020/05/28/863932758/stung-by-twitter-trump-signs-
executive-order-to-weaken-social-media-companies [https://perma.cc/9QHF-UYL4] (“President
Trump signed an executive order Thursday aimed at limiting the broad legal protections
enjoyed by social media companies, two days after he tore into Twitter for fact-checking two
of his tweets.”).
125. For example, at the end of his term, President Trump vetoed the National Defense
Authorization Act when Congress declined to include a provision repealing section 230. Catie
Edmondson, Senate Overrides Trump’s Veto of Defense Bill, Dealing a Legislative Blow, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 1, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/01/us/politics/senate-override-trump-
defense-bill.html [https://perma.cc/B7GN-3KC5]. Both Houses of Congress voted to override
the veto, and the bill thus became law. See id.
126. Taylor Hatmaker, Nancy Pelosi Warns Tech Companies that Section 230 Is ‘in
Jeopardy,’ TECHCRUNCH (Apr. 12, 2019, 3:35 PM), https://techcrunch.com/2019/04/12/nancy-
pelosi-section-230/ [https://perma.cc/T9SU-PQ5F]; E&C Announces Additional Details for
Hearing on Online Content Moderation and Section 230, HOUSE COMM. ON ENERGY & COM.
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executive and legislative branches will no doubt continue, and
section 230 may very well face major revision soon.
B. Scholarly Critiques of Section 230
Over its history, section 230 has been the subject of much
academic inquiry and critique. The debate has often recognized the
lack of remedies available to victims of online abuse and other torts,
but it has focused on vastly different approaches to redefining the
contours of platform immunity.
One approach to section 230 reform argues that it should be
narrowed in order to allow some remedies for defamation and libel
victims.127 Another approach focuses on providing users with a right
to order removal of content. A notice-and-takedown scheme, similar
to that contained in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, has been
proposed as one such solution.128 More generally, scholars have
observed the need for clarity as to the scope of online safe harbors,
including those available under section 230.129 One obstacle to
meaningful recovery for victims is the barriers to suing responsible
parties, whether it be a web platform or its (often anonymous)
(Oct. 9, 2019), https://energycommerce.house.gov/newsroom/press-releases/ec-announces-
additional-details-for-hearing-on-online-content-moderation-and [https://perma.cc/9BMZ-
EMW4] (announcing a hearing called by three Democratic Members of Congress to “explor[e]
online content moderation practices and whether consumers are adequately protected under
current law, including the protections Congress granted in Section 230 of the Communications
Decency Act”).
127. Vanessa S. Browne-Barbour, Losing Their License to Libel: Revisiting § 230 Immunity,
30 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1505, 1505 (2015) (arguing for a more nuanced analysis of the
distributor/publisher distinction or, alternatively, proposing a notice-and-takedown provision
resembling that of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act); Melissa A. Troiano, Comment, The
New Journalism? Why Traditional Defamation Laws Should Apply to Internet Blogs, 55 AM.
U. L. REV. 1447, 1448 (2006) (arguing that bloggers should not always be immune from
defamation claims).
128. See, e.g., Browne-Barbour, supra note 127, at 1505. One commentator suggests that
section 230 reform should include notice-and-takedown procedures in cases of online
impersonation and a requirement that websites honor court orders to remove third-party
content. Andrew P. Bolson, Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act: A Blueprint for
Reform, MEDIUM (June 19, 2019), https://medium.com/@andrewbolson/section-230-of-the-
communications-decency-act-a-blueprint-for-reform-ee8aa50d4430 [https://perma.cc/DE6K-
D9WM].
129. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Rationalizing Internet Safe Harbors, 6 J. ON TELECOMM. &
HIGH TECH. L. 101, 102 (2007).
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users.130 Thus, some reforms focus on making it easier to bring
lawsuits against platforms or third-party posters when immunity
does not apply under the circumstances.131
Danielle Citron and Benjamin Wittes have pointed out that
section 230 expressly contemplates immunizing platforms that act
as “Good Samaritans.”132 Cases that broadly interpret section 230
often insulate bad faith conduct by platforms that exist for the
purpose of facilitating offensive, obscene, or even illegal content.
This runs afoul of the “Good Samaritan” content moderation en-
visioned by section 230 itself. Thus, they have proposed standards
that look at the good faith or bad faith actions of the platform and
the nature of the content itself.133
130. See Choi, supra note 45, at 539 & n.145.
131. See id. at 505-07 (arguing that online anonymity should be regulated to provide
recourse against third-party content providers without imposing innovation-crushing
regulation on platforms themselves); Bolson, supra note 128 (suggesting that websites should
be required to have a U.S. address for service of process and that procedures for unmasking
anonymous posters should be less onerous); Gus Hurwitz, The Third Circuit’s Oberdorf v.
Amazon Opinion Offers a Good Approach to Reining in the Worst Abuses of Section 230,
TRUTH ON MKT. (July 15, 2019), https://truthonthemarket.com/2019/07/15/the-third-circuits-
oberdorf-v-amazon-opinion-offers-a-good-approach-to-reining-in-the-worst-abuses-of-section-
230/ [https://perma.cc/94BR-PSKL] (noting that courts should require online marketplaces to
identify third parties to facilitate direct claims, rather than going after the online
marketplace).
132. Danielle Keats Citron & Benjamin Wittes, The Internet Will Not Break: Denying Bad
Samaritans § 230 Immunity, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 401, 416 (2017). Citron and Wittes argue
that
courts should limit [section 230’s] application to Good Samaritans. Section 230's
title reflects this purpose: “[p]rotection for private blocking and screening of
offensive material.” So does subsection (c)’s subtitle: “[p]rotection for ‘Good
Samaritan’ blocking and screening of offensive material.” “[T]he title of a statute
and the heading of a section are ‘tools available for the resolution of a doubt’
about the meaning of a statute.”
Id. (second, third, and fourth alterations in original) (first citing Danielle Keats Citron, Cyber
Civil Rights, 89 B.U. L. REV. 61, 116 n.377 (2009); then quoting 47 U.S.C. § 230; then quoting
id. § 230(c); and then quoting Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 234 (1998));
see also Gregory M. Dickinson, Note, An Interpretive Framework for Narrower Immunity
Under Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 863, 870
(2010) (discussing the ways in which section 230 jurisprudence has moved away from the
“Good Samaritan” role envisioned by subsection (c) and noting the undesirable policy
outcomes from broad immunity for bad faith conduct).
133. Citron & Wittes, supra note 132, at 416. Other approaches have focused on limiting
section 230 to civil immunity or otherwise reforming it to allow for greater criminal liability.
See Shruti Jaishankar, Note, Earning Immunity Under 47 U.S.C. § 230, 8 ALA. C.R. & C.L.
L. REV. 295, 304 (2017) (explaining how section 230 interacts with criminal statutes and how
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Other proposals for improving section 230 have focused on more
nuanced definitions of computer services and content providers so
that a clearer test emerges for what level of content development
defeats immunity. Some have suggested that platforms may need to
be liable when they personalize content through machine-learning
algorithms.134 And, most notably, Benjamin Edelman and Abbey
Stemler have noted that the “online computer service” definition is
ill-suited to address online marketplaces and other platforms that
facilitate real-world transactions.135 Additionally, some commenta-
tors have noted that vicarious liability principles from tort law may
still apply despite section 230 in certain cases.136
Others warn that modifications to section 230 are not the solution
for many of the wrongs that need remedies. For example, Daphne
Keller argues that hate speech and privacy violations are not
necessarily prevalent because of section 230 and that attempts to
attribute all legal shortcomings in online spaces to section 230 are
ill-advised.137 Keller also argues that calls for platform neutrality,138
on the one hand, and platform policing of user speech,139 on the
it hinders meaningful enforcement of harassment laws); Ashley Ingber, Note, Cyber Crime
Control: Will Websites Ever Be Held Accountable for the Legal Activities They Profit from?, 18
CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 423, 426 (2012) (urging for legislative reform and narrower judicial
application of section 230 when a platform is used to facilitate criminal activity).
134. See, e.g., Catherine Tremble, Note, Wild Westworld: Section 230 of the CDA and Social
Networks’ Use of Machine-Learning Algorithms, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 825, 867 (2017)
(suggesting liability is appropriate for a platform as publisher “where the technology in
question may have a hand in development of information or where the conduct of that
technology is the source of the alleged harm”).
135. Benjamin Edelman & Abbey Stemler, From the Digital to the Physical: Federal
Limitations on Regulating Online Marketplaces, 56 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 141, 168 (2019) (“In
extending far beyond computer service to real-world transactions with real-world
implications, marketplaces may exceed the boundaries of § 230’s safe harbor because they are
not purely providers of interactive computer services. This is especially true when the
majority of a marketplace’s activities are outside the scope of immunity intended by
Congress.”); see also Gregory M. Dickinson, Rebooting Internet Immunity, 347, 351-52 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. (2021) (noting how section 230’s binary classification of platforms is poorly
tailored to address the array of modern platforms now available).
136. See, e.g., Dickinson, supra note 132, at 864.
137. Daphne Keller, Toward a Clearer Conversation About Platform Liability, KNIGHT
FIRST AMEND. INST. (Apr. 6, 2018), https://knightcolumbia.org/content/toward-clearer-
conversation-about-platform-liability [https://perma.cc/WW8E-3NSL].
138. See id.; see also Annemarie Bridy, Remediating Social Media: A Layer-Conscious
Approach, 24 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 193, 198 (2018) (explaining why “must-carry” rules are
not the solution to curtail online abuse).
139. See DAPHNE KELLER, INTERNET PLATFORMS: OBSERVATIONS ON SPEECH, DANGER, AND
1584 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62:1557
other, are both flawed approaches. Finally, Eric Goldman argues
that section 230 provides greater procedural and substantive
benefits than the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and
remains a crucial feature of the modern internet.140
Taken as a whole, section 230 scholarship recognizes the statute’s
importance while often noting its shortcomings. Similarly, this
Article seeks to maintain the core function of section 230—to
prevent traditional defamation-based tort liability from stifling free
speech on the internet—while redefining its contours to better
address modern platforms.
II. REDEFINING PLATFORM IMMUNITY USING JOINT ENTERPRISE
THEORY
Section 230 enables platforms to moderate content and to let
users engage in free expression online, and this core purpose should
be preserved. But section 230’s reach becomes too broad when it
immunizes platforms that directly profit from and exert some
control over transactions that cause harm. Therefore, courts
applying section 230 should also consider the economic activity in
which modern platforms engage. In this vein, the theory of joint
enterprise liability can shed light on the economic relationship
between the platform and its users. In particular, by looking at the
pecuniary interest of the platform and its right of control in
individual transactions, section 230 can carve out actors who should
bear the cost of harm, while still preserving the statute’s goals of
promoting free expression and enabling content moderation.
This Section first provides an overview of joint enterprise liability
and urges that section 230 move away from its reliance on the
binary classification of “service” or “provider.” It then explores the
range of modern platforms that now exist, using sharing economy
platforms and online marketplaces as examples. Finally, this
MONEY 1 (Hoover Inst. Aegis Series Paper No. 1807, 2018) https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=3262936 [https://perma.cc/UU2U-82VW].
140. Goldman, supra note 39; see also Rebecca Tushnet, Power Without Responsibility:
Intermediaries and the First Amendment, 76 GEO.WASH.L.REV. 986, 1002 (2008) (noting that
the First Amendment does not bar meaningful regulation of intermediaries).
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Section explains how the joint enterprise framework can help
redefine modern platform immunity.
A. Joint Enterprise Liability Generally
Joint enterprise liability is a species of vicarious liability in tort
law.141 At its core, joint enterprise liability stands for the proposition
that two entities who are engaging in a common business purpose
are jointly liable for any resulting harms.142 A business purpose is
generally required, and joint enterprises typically arise out of an
express or implied contractual relationship between the entities.143
For example, the Restatement (Second) of Torts defines a “joint
enterprise” as broader and more inclusive than just a business
partnership.144 Instead, a joint enterprise not only includes perma-
nent business arrangements such as business partnerships, but also
contemplates “less formal arrangements for cooperation, for a more
limited period of time and a more limited purpose.”145
The key then is that both entities in the joint enterprise “have a
voice in directing the conduct of the enterprise.”146 Additionally,
some sort of pecuniary interest is also required.147 Thus, the ele-
ments for a joint enterprise can be summed up as
141. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 491 cmt. b (AM. L. INST. 1965) (“A joint
enterprise includes ... an undertaking to carry out a small number of activities or objectives,
or even a single one, entered into by members of the group under such circumstances that all
have a voice in directing the conduct of the enterprise. The law then considers that each is the
agent or servant of the others, and that the act of any one within the scope of the enterprise
is to be charged vicariously against the rest.”). Vicarious liability is the principle that a person
stands in the shoes of the tortfeasor by virtue of his relationship with the tortfeasor. See
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 13 (AM.L. INST. 2000). The vicariously liable party need not
have committed any tortious act in order to be held liable for the acts of the other; the liability
exists by imputation. See id. § 13 cmt. a. Notable types of relationships giving rise to vicarious
liability are that of the master and servant—also called respondeat superior liability—and
that of the parent and child. Id.
142. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 13; Stephens v. Jones, 710 S.W.2d 38, 41 (Tenn.
Ct. App. 1984) (holding that a business purpose is required for a finding of joint enterprise).
143. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 491 cmt. c; see also Blount v. Bordens, Inc.,
910 S.W.2d 931, 933 (Tex. 1995).
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(1) an agreement, express or implied, among the members of the
group; (2) a common purpose to be carried out by the group; (3)
a community of pecuniary interest in that purpose, among the
members; and (4) an equal right to a voice in the direction of the
enterprise, which gives an equal right of control.148
Joint enterprise liability reflects the social utility and public
policy roles tort law plays in society. Several tort rationales support
joint enterprise liability, including cost allocation, adequate compen-
sation, and fairness.149
First, under the rationale of cost allocation, the cost of a single
actor’s tort is best allocated to the master for which that actor is
engaged, particularly given that the actor is furthering the business
purpose of the master.150 For joint enterprise liability in particular,
the theory of cost allocation also supports making the non-tortfeasor
entity of the joint venture fully responsible for the other’s independ-
ent acts of negligence in light of their joint business purpose.151
Cost allocation is a rationale underlying other no-fault regimes
within tort law. All forms of vicarious liability and imputed neg-
ligence essentially hold an entity liable for some other tortfeasor’s
fault by virtue of the relationship between the entity and the
tortfeasor.152 It often relies on the principal-agent relationship and
148. Id. § 491 cmt. c. Joint enterprise liability often comes up in the automobile context but
is not limited to that category of cases. Id. § 491 cmt. b.
149. See, e.g., Mark A. Geistfeld, The Coherence of Compensation-Deterrence Theory in Tort
Law, 61 DEPAUL L. REV. 383, 394-95 (2012); John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky,
Tort Law and Moral Luck, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 1123, 1127 (2007) (emphasizing the corrective
justice purpose of tort law over “moral luck”); John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky,
Torts as Wrongs, 88 TEX. L. REV. 917, 986 (2010) (arguing that tort law should be
conceptualized as righting a legal wrong and not merely as a system for allocating costs for
accidental losses); Gary T. Schwartz, Reality in the Economic Analysis of Tort Law: Does Tort
Law Really Deter?, 42 UCLA L. REV. 377, 430 (1994); Benjamin Shmueli, Legal Pluralism in
Tort Law Theory: Balancing Instrumental Theories and Corrective Justice, 48 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 745, 748-49 (2015) (arguing for a pluralistic approach that balances multiple goals
of tort law).
150. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 13 cmt. b. (AM. L. INST. 2000).
151. See Shell Oil Co. v. Prestidge, 249 F.2d 413, 414-16 (9th Cir. 1957). In Shell Oil, the
Ninth Circuit affirmed the trial court’s ruling that two oil companies were jointly liable to the
plaintiff, who suffered a burn injury while awaiting a job interview at an oil drill site. Id. The
site was owned by Shell Oil but assigned to Rocky Mountain Oil pursuant to an express
agreement giving both companies joint control and a sharing of costs and profits. Id. at 415.
152. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 13 (stating that joint and several liability applies
when liability is imputed on an entity based on the tortious conduct of some other actor).
2021] PLATFORM IMMUNITY REDEFINED 1587
recognizes the economic reality that agents may lack the means to
pay for a victim’s harm, while the principal may be a wealthier
entity capable of paying the victim.153 Because vicarious liability
does not require negligence on the principal’s part, it is akin to a
theory of strict liability.154 Notably, strict liability also looks to cost
allocation as a rationale, recognizing that the actor engaged in an
activity causing harm is most able to bear the cost of the victim’s
harm.155
Second, the theories of just compensation and fairness also
underlie joint enterprise liability. While cost allocation can be seen
as furthering a broader social good, just compensation and fairness
instead focus on the individual rights of tort victims.156 The core
consideration is that plaintiffs who suffer harm deserve compensa-
tion from the tortfeasor.157 And when two entities operate as a joint
enterprise, fairness concerns often dictate that plaintiffs should be
allowed to seek adequate compensation from any of the parties to
the joint venture.158
Furthering these rationales, joint enterprise liability builds on
the principle that joint venturers who stand to profit from an activ-
ity should both be on the hook for the liability that may arise from
the activity as well.159 In order to deem two entities a joint enter-
prise, there must be some agreement among the joint venturers, a
common purpose among them, a pecuniary interest or motive, and
a shared right of control in the joint enterprise.160 The joint enter-
prise need not be a business-wide partnership but instead can exist
153. See, e.g., Sykes, supra note 32, at 1235 (reviewing the economic implications of
vicarious liability versus personal liability regimes and noting that agents are often
individuals of limited means, while principals are often wealthier individuals). Although a
principal held vicariously liable for the acts of the agent likely owes the whole cost of the harm
to the victim, the principal can seek indemnity from the agent. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
TORTS § 22 (stating that a person held liable only through vicarious liability is entitled to
recover indemnity from the other liable person or persons).
154. See Keating, Theory of Enterprise Liability, supra note 32, at 1286.
155. Id. at 1286-87.




159. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 13 cmt. c (AM. L. INST. 2000).
160. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 491 cmt. c (AM. L. INST. 1965).
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for an individual transaction or incident.161 Joint enterprise theory
in general has been characterized as economically justified,162 as it
assigns liability to the enterprise and likely promotes a greater level
of care as a result.163
Courts have applied joint enterprise liability in numerous con-
texts, from oil drilling and construction projects to transportation
and patent cases. For example, two oil companies were liable as a
joint enterprise when a prospective employee was injured at an oil
drill site.164 The court held the companies were joint venturers
because one company owned the lease for the drilling site and the
other company was assigned the lease, with an agreement about
joint control and profit sharing.165 Similarly, another court deter-
mined that a city transit authority and a state department of
transportation constituted a joint enterprise and thus found both
liable for two deaths caused by a head-on collision in a carpool lane
because both agencies were responsible for its construction and
maintenance.166 In the transportation context, joint enterprise
liability has also been used to hold a passenger or car owner liable
161. See id. § 491 cmt. b.
162. See, e.g., W. Keith Robinson, Economic Theory, Divided Infringement, and Enforcing
Interactive Patents, 67 FLA. L. REV. 1961, 2029 (2015) (noting some of the ways use of a joint
enterprise test for enforcing interactive patents would promote the economic function of the
patent system); Dmitry Karshtedt, Divided Infringement, Economics, and the Common Law,
67 FLA. L. REV. F. 329, 340 (2018) (“[T]he Federal Circuit’s acceptance of the joint enterprise
form of attribution in patent law is reasonable because this doctrine seems to solve similar
problems throughout various areas of law, and is one on which courts have converged because
it makes economic sense.”).
163. See Kornhauser, supra note 33, at 1380 (“This paper’s model suggests that in the
private sector, enterprise liability produces greater levels of care.”).
164. Shell Oil Co. v. Prestidge, 249 F.2d 413, 414-16 (9th Cir. 1957).
165. Id. at 416.
166. Tex. Dep’t of Transp. v. Able, 35 S.W.3d 608, 615, 618 (Tex. 2000). Under the
“dangerous instrumentality” doctrine, strict vicarious liability for a driver’s negligence has
been imposed on those who have an identifiable property interest in the driver’s vehicle. See,
e.g., Fojtik v. Hunter, 828 A.2d 589, 595 (Conn. 2003) (holding an entity renting or leasing a
vehicle liable for damages to the same extent as the vehicle’s operator); Christensen v. Bowen,
140 So. 3d 498, 506 (Fla. 2014) (holding that a vehicle owner had control and use over the
vehicle and exercised control by granting custody to the operator, thereby accepting potential
liability); Murdza v. Zimmerman, 786 N.E.2d 440, 442-44 (N.Y. 2003) (holding a vehicle owner
liable for accidents in the vehicle in order to provide recourse against financially responsible
defendants, promote care in who can operate a vehicle, and remove hardships for injured
plaintiffs).
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for the negligence of a driver in an automobile collision167 and to bar
claims by an injured passenger against the car’s driver.168
In the patent context, joint enterprise liability is a recognized
means for establishing method patent infringement against
multiple defendants. In Akamai Technologies, Inc. v. Limelight Net-
works, Inc., the Federal Circuit held that,
[w]here more than one actor is involved in practicing the steps
[for infringement], a court must determine whether the acts of
one are attributable to the other such that a single entity is
responsible for the infringement. We will hold an entity respon-
sible for others’ performance of method steps in two sets of
circumstances: (1) where that entity directs or controls others’
performance, and (2) where the actors form a joint enterprise.169
The court looked to the general principles of vicarious liability,
including the four elements contained in the Restatement (Second)
of Torts definition of joint enterprise.170 Failure to establish the
elements of a joint enterprise can defeat a joint infringement
claim.171
167. See, e.g., Troutman v. Ollis, 417 N.W.2d 589, 594 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987) (holding that
the plaintiffs could bring a claim under joint enterprise theory against the owner and
passengers of the automobile that caused the accident); Straffus v. Barclay, 219 S.W.2d 65,
69 (Tex. 1949) (holding that the driver and passenger, who owned the automobile, had the
shared objective of cleaning the church and buying groceries and were thus engaged in joint
enterprise when they crashed into another car). But see, e.g., Reed v. Hinderland, 660 P.2d
464, 470 (Ariz. 1983) (“We hold that the mere presence of the owner in an automobile driven
by another does not create any presumption of a ... joint enterprise. The existence of such a
relationship must be proved by the party asserting it in the same manner as any other issue
in the case.”).
168. See, e.g., Yant v. Woods, 120 S.W.3d 574, 580 (Ark. 2003). But some courts do not
allow the joint enterprise doctrine to bar a passenger’s recovery from the car’s driver. See
Reed, 660 P.2d at 466 (holding that imputed contributory negligence of the passenger is not
presumed when the passenger sues the driver for damages); Gilmer v. Carney, 608 N.E.2d
709, 711 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that imputed negligence through joint enterprise
applies only in actions against third persons); Kalechman v. Drew Auto Rental, Inc., 308
N.E.2d 886, 891 (N.Y. 1973) (holding that a passenger’s wrongful death claim against a driver
is not to be barred by joint enterprise doctrine).
169. 797 F.3d 1020, 1022 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
170. Id. at 1023.
171. See, e.g., Midwest Energy Emissions Corp. v. Vistra Energy Corp., No. 19-1334-RGA-
CJB, 2020 WL 3316056, at *10 (D. Del. June 18, 2020) (holding that the plaintiff failed to
establish that the defendants had “an equal right to a voice in the direction of the enterprise”).
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At its core, joint enterprise liability recognizes that entities
standing to profit from an activity, albeit jointly with another actor,
should be allocated some of the costs of accidents that flow from
their activities.172 It allows for a flexible, transaction-by-transaction
approach that hinges on the enterprise’s business purpose.173 These
features suggest that joint enterprise liability may also be able to
assist in redefining platform immunity under section 230.
B. Moving Away from the Binary Classification of “Service” or
“Provider”
A joint enterprise approach allows for more nuance in the
analysis of modern platforms when compared to section 230’s
current binary classification of internet actors as either an “interac-
tive computer service” or “information content provider.” While the
current binary classification may have sufficed in the 1990s, it does
not adequately capture the range of internet platforms that cur-
rently exist some thirty years later.
Thus, section 230’s computer service/content provider distinction
should be interpreted to incorporate a joint enterprise analysis to
better distinguish among the wider range of modern platforms. In
other words, a platform that functions as a joint enterprise with the
content provider should lose immunity under section 230.
1. The Range of Modern Platforms
A joint enterprise framework for redefining platform immunity
aligns with the evolution of the internet. In 1996, when section 230
was enacted, the internet was described as being in its “infancy.”174
References to different iterations of the internet (“Web 2.0” to “Web
3.0”) hint at the perceived evolution of the internet.175 Regardless of
172. See Keating, Idea of Fairness, supra note 32, at 1269.
173. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 491 cmt. b (AM. L. INST. 1965).
174. See, e.g., Darren Waters, Web in Infancy, Says Berners-Lee, BBCNEWS (Apr. 30, 2008,
4:30 AM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/7371660.stm [https://perma.cc/5UZE-JUSB]
(quoting Sir Tim Berners-Lee, the inventor of the world wide web, as saying that the web was
“still in its infancy” as of 2008).
175. “Web 2.0” refers to the second wave of technological improvements to change the
internet, marked by the rise of user-generated content, such as blogs and social networking
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what titles can be coined to describe different phases of the
internet’s development, the basic premise of its evolution remains
the same: over time, the nature of internet-based businesses has
changed. And some online actors have evolved into large enterprises
that stand to profit from their involvement in individual transac-
tions.176 As such, section 230’s computer service/content provider
delineation must also evolve to capture the modern range of roles
internet actors play and the economic realities of e-commerce.
For example, when section 230 came into existence in 1996,
internet actors played a more limited role in peer-to-peer interac-
tions online. Message boards allowed social interaction and the
exchange of ideas,177 and forums such as Craigslist permitted users
to share housing or goods.178 But message boards and forums such
as Craigslist did not set prices, curate listings, or take a cut of
profits from peer-to-peer ridesharing or homesharing transactions,
in stark contrast to the role that Uber, Airbnb, and similar plat-
forms now play.
The term “platform” itself has emerged to better describe the
range of online activity emerging in a mobile-enabled, connected
world. Definitions vary, but in the broadest sense, a platform is
hardware or software that forms the base for other programs or ac-
tivities.179 Modern internet platforms generally connect individuals
sites, and cloud computing, which allows more programs to run within the web browser itself.
See, e.g., Definition of Web. 2.0, PCMAG: ENCYC., https://www.pcmag.com/encyclopedia/term/
56219/web-2-0 [https://perma.cc/4HUV-BW4U] (defining the key features of “Web 2.0” and
explaining the origins of the term).
176. See Kenneth A. Bamberger & Orly Lobel, Platform Market Power, 32 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 1051, 1053 (2017) (“Looking at Uber also illuminates the important reality that platform
companies can be very different from each other in terms of the markets they serve, the type
and degree of the power that they exercise within respective markets, and the relative effects
of their activities on competition. Newer platform companies such as Uber and Airbnb share
characteristics with (relatively) older platforms such as Amazon, eBay, Facebook and Google,
in that they use the power and networking capacity of online technology and data analytics
to create multisided markets that can quickly scale and achieve market dominance.”).
177. See, e.g., supra notes 53-56 and accompanying text (discussing cases from the early
to mid-1990s involving message boards).
178. See, e.g., Mission and History, supra note 2.
179. See, e.g., Platform, PCMAG: ENCYC., https://www.pcmag.com/encyclopedia/term/plat
form [https://perma.cc/HAU6-V39A] (defining “platform” as “hardware and/or software archi-
tecture that serves as a foundation or base” and explaining that “[t]he term originally dealt
with hardware and often still refers to only a CPU model or computer family”).
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to each other, or to goods and services, using the internet.180 Thus,
a platform can include any application that uses the internet to
provide a service, whether it be connecting individuals to each other
for social purposes, offering a product for sale, or otherwise.181
Several governmental bodies, other groups, and scholars have
attempted to provide some nuance as to the nature of modern
internet platforms.182 These groups seem to recognize that, rather
than lumping vastly different online activity under one singular
definition, more detailed classifications are necessary.
Legal scholars have also attempted to define platforms. Defini-
tions include “an online intermediary between buyers and sellers of
180. See, e.g., Online Platform, PCMAG: ENCYC., https://www.pcmag.com/encyclopedia/
term/online-platform [https://perma.cc/2XMV-74R9] (defining “online platform” as “[a]n online
marketplace that places one party in touch with another, such as buyers and sellers”; ex-
plaining that online platforms “may be entirely self-contained” or “may allow third-party apps
to connect via the platform’s programming interface (API)”; and listing “eBay, Craigslist,
Amazon Marketplace, Airbnb and Uber” as examples of online platforms).
181. The European Commission (EC) has also examined the nature of online platforms as
part of developing its “strategy for the digital single market.” See Online Platforms and the
Digital Single Market Opportunities and Challenges for Europe, COM (2016) 288 final, at 2
(May 25, 2016), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52016DC
0288&from=EN [https://perma.cc/TV6Q-BSVG]. In its report, the EC acknowledged that on-
line platforms (including sharing economy platforms and online intermediaries) take many
different forms and encompass various economic activities. Id. Thus, the EC held workshops,
conducted studies, and polled the public to help define some of the issues surrounding online
platforms. Id. In its work, the EC noted that platforms “cover a wide-ranging set of activities
including online advertising platforms, marketplaces, search engines, social media and crea-
tive content outlets, application distribution platforms, communications services, payment
systems, and platforms for the collaborative economy.” Id. (footnote omitted). Finally, the EC
noted that online platforms 
process ... large amounts of data; ... operate in multisided markets but with
varying degrees of control over direct interactions between groups of users; ...
benefit from ‘network effects’, where ... the value of the service increases with
the number of users; ... rely on information and communications technologies to
reach their users, instantly and effortlessly; ... [and] play a key role in digital
value creation.
Id. at 2-3.
182. See, e.g., eCommerce Defined, INT’LTRADE ADMIN., https://www.trade.gov/ecommerce-
definitions [https://perma.cc/PSP2-BWN2]; FTC “Sharing Economy” Report Explores Evolv-
ing Internet and App-Based Services, FTC (Nov. 17, 2016), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/
press-releases/2016/11/ftc-sharing-economy-report-explores-evolving-internet-app-based
[https://perma.cc/2A73-UUD8]; Letter from The App Ass’n to the FTC (Aug. 20, 2018), https://
actonline.org/wp-content/uploads/Q3-ACT-Comments-re-FTC-2018-Consumer-Protection-
Hearings-082018-FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/EG8T-JVM9]; Request for Information from
Platform Providers of Commercial e-Commerce Portals, 83 Fed. Reg. 27,986 (requested June
15, 2018).
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goods and services—the ancient role of the middleman—enhanced
with the modern power afforded by cloud computing, algorithmic
matching, pervasive wireless Internet access, scaled user-networks,
and near-universal customer ownership of smartphones and
tablets.”183 While Facebook, eBay, and other apps and websites can
fit this definition generally, platforms have evolved even further
into “the new wave of digital companies ... based on the logic of
multi-sided markets that disrupt traditional offline interactions by
reshaping the ways individuals transact.”184 Airbnb, Uber, and
Amazon may fit into the new wave of platforms that blur real-world
and online transactions in new and challenging ways.185
Another definition points out that modern “[p]latforms exploit the
affordances of network organization and supply infrastructures that
facilitate particular types of interactions, but they also represent
strategies for bounding networks and privatizing and controlling
infrastructures.”186 To accomplish this, “[p]latforms use technical
protocols and centralized control to define networked spaces in
which users can conduct a heterogeneous array of activities and to
structure those spaces for ease of use.”187
Thus, modern platforms include a plethora of activity, from social
media applications to sharing economy companies. Even more
importantly, the underlying business of modern platforms also
varies, with greater opportunities for direct involvement and control
over transactions.188 While some platforms may provide a forum for
third-party speech—making money through ads and monetizing
user data—others may play a more direct and active role in
providing goods and services.189 Further, the rise of mobile comput-
ing and platform-only business models marks a shift in the
internet’s evolution.190
183. Lobel, supra note 19, at 94.
184. Id.
185. See id. at 89.
186. E.g., Cohen, supra note 19, at 144.
187. Id. at 145.
188. See The 9 Types of Software Platforms, MEDIUM: PLATFORM HUNT (June 12, 2016),
https://medium.com/platform-hunt/the-8-types-of-software-platforms-473c74f4536a
[https://perma.cc/4C26-BXKU] (analyzing over 170 platforms of all sizes and classifying them
into nine categories).
189. See id.
190. See Lobel, supra note 19, at 94-95.
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Modern internet platforms have thus expanded their economic
activities, and the lines between real-world and virtual-world
transactions are becoming more blurred. Some internet platforms
have moved beyond message boards and community forums into
sophisticated for-profit enterprises that facilitate real-world
commerce in ways unforeseen at the time section 230 was first
enacted. Sharing economy platforms and online marketplaces, in
particular, illustrate the need for a more nuanced analysis of the
platform’s role in individual transactions.
a. Sharing Economy Platforms 
The “sharing economy” is a broad term referring to peer-to-peer
exchanges of goods and services.191 Many modern sharing economy
platforms use their own assets and infrastructure to facilitate the
underlying peer-to-peer transactions. Although they purport to
function as intermediaries that simply connect individuals to each
other,192 sharing economy platforms often function as unique, for-
profit enterprises.193 And many sharing economy platforms make a
point to shun traditional, direct relationships between company and
employee, or company and customer.194 By linking people to each
other, sharing economy platforms claim that they merely act as a
platform for informal economic activity.195 But these platforms often
have capital assets and their own profit models that distinguish
them from a simple website that allows peer-to-peer exchanges.196
They may control the transactions they facilitate by dictating the
mode and manner of performance and taking a share of profits from
each underlying transaction.197 In this way, a sharing economy
platform does not serve as a message board but rather as a central-
ized business that just happens to rely on small-scale providers.
191. See McPeak, supra note 12, at 177-78.
192. See id. at 179 nn.30-33; see also Miriam A. Cherry, Corporate Social Responsibility and
Crowdwashing in the Gig Economy, 63 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1, 15 (2018) (“The refusal to use the
terminology that the legal system typically uses to discuss labor and employment law issues
is troubling and may also signal evasion.”).
193. See Bamberger & Lobel, supra note 176, at 1053-54.
194. See McPeak, supra note 12, at 216.
195. See id.
196. See Cohen, supra note 19, at 142.
197. See id. at 142, 145-47.
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Uber, for example, does not own a fleet of cars, but instead uses
ad-hoc drivers in their own vehicles.198 Nonetheless, Uber sets the
prices, imposes specific performance and quality requirements on its
drivers, and otherwise controls its business.199 Uber exerts consider-
able control over transactions that happen on its platform by
making transactions entirely cashless in many places,200 requiring
users to enter credit card information before they can request a ride,
and collecting payment from riders directly, later passing on a
portion of the money to drivers.201 Uber also sets its prices, including
experimentation with “surge pricing” and other pricing models
enforced by the platform.202 Drivers receive a set percentage of the
fare, as determined by Uber.203 Uber also requires drivers to meet
certain safety requirements.204 Notably, Uber characterizes its
drivers as independent contractors and not employees, a classifica-
tion that has been challenged by regulators and litigants.205 To be
198. See How Does Uber Work?, UBERHELP, https://help.uber.com/riders/article/how-does-
uber-work?nodeId=738d1ff7-5fe0-4383-b34c-4a2480efd71e [https://perma.cc/58UX-LPVD].
199. See How Are Fares Calculated?, supra note 16.
200. See How Does Uber Work?, supra note 198.
201. See id.; How Much Can Drivers Make with Uber?, UBER, https://www.uber.com/us/en/
drive/how-much-drivers-make/ [https://perma.cc/BC2P-7WNW].
202. See How Are Fares Calculated?, supra note 16; What’s Happening When Prices Surge?,
UBER MARKETPLACE, https://marketplace.uber.com/pricing/surge-pricing [https://perma.cc/
4JQ2-DZ8V].
203. See How Much Can Drivers Make with Uber?, supra note 201. Uber experimented with
allowing California drivers to set their own fares in response to California legislation that
reclassifies some gig workers as employees. See Said, supra note 16.
204. Safety, supra note 17.
205. See, e.g., Doe v. Uber Techs., Inc., 184 F. Supp. 3d 774, 785 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (denying
Uber’s motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ claims on the ground that “[t]he California Supreme Court
has left [the] question open” of whether Uber drivers are employees or independent con-
tractors); Berwick v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 11-46739 EK, 2015 WL 4153765, at *6 (Cal. Dep’t
of Lab. June 3, 2015) (“Plaintiff’s car and her labor were her only assets. Plaintiff’s work did
not entail any ‘managerial’ skills that could affect profit or loss. Aside from her car, Plaintiff
had no investment in the business. Defendants provided the iPhone application, which was
essential to the work. But for Defendant’s intellectual property, Plaintiff would not have been
able to perform the work. In light of the above, Plaintiff was Defendants’ employee.”). After
extensive lobbying, sharing economy platforms helped pass a state ballot initiative in late
2020 that allows them to continue classifying their workers as independent contractors,
despite the California Senate having recently enacted Assembly Bill 5 to reclassify on-demand
workers as employees. Danielle Abril, Uber, Lyft, and Gig Companies Win Big After Prop 22
Passes in California, FORTUNE (Nov. 4, 2020, 12:42 AM), https://fortune.com/2020/11/04/prop-
22-california-proposition-uber-lyft-gig-companies-workers-passes/ [https://perma.cc/G4KC-
SP99].
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an Uber passenger, an app user must agree to the terms and
services of the app, including its arbitration clause.206
In recent years, Uber has expanded beyond ridesharing services.
It sees itself as providing “a global logistics layer” for a plethora of
transportation-related services.207 Uber exists in more than sixty
countries, has nearly four million drivers, and boasts tens of
millions of “monthly active platform consumers.”208 It has branched
into carpooling services with UberPool,209 meal delivery with Uber
Eats,210 shipping services with Uber Freight,211 and kitten-snuggling
services with UberKittens.212 Uber was also developing self-driving
car technology.213
Companies like Uber represent a new, evolving form of online
commerce, and their activities blur the line between online interme-
diaries and real-world commercial actors. Nonetheless, Uber has
attempted to classify itself as a platform and not a transportation
provider.214 According to Uber, it is providing “mobile applications
and related services” and makes a point to classify itself as an
206. See U.S. Terms of Use, supra note 18; Alison Frankel, Forced into Arbitration, 12,500
Drivers Claim Uber Won’t Pay Fees to Launch Cases, REUTERS (Dec. 6, 2018, 2:55 PM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/legal-us-otc-uber-idINKBN1O52C6 [https://perma.cc/D2TZ-
E2H5].
207. See Company Info, UBERNEWSROOM, https://www.uber.com/newsroom/company-info/
[https://perma.cc/K3H9-9JH7].
208. Id.
209. O’Connell, supra note 8.
210. Id.
211. E.g., Jennifer Smith, Uber Freight Launches Ratings for Cargo Facilities, WALL ST. J.
(Jan. 31, 2019, 9:00 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/uber-freight-launches-ratings-for-
cargo-facilities-11548943201 [https://perma.cc/LET5-894V].
212. See I Can Has UberKITTENS, UBERBLOG (Oct. 29, 2013), https://www.uber.com/blog/
i-can-has-uberkittens/ [https://perma.cc/8FKS-LTZX]. UberKittens somehow involves
cupcakes in addition to cuddling with kittens. See id.
213. E.g. Sameepa Shetty, Uber’s Self-Driving Cars Are a Key to Its Path to Profitability,
CNBC (Jan. 28, 2020, 7:01 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/01/28/ubers-self-driving-cars-are-
a-key-to-its-path-to-profitability.html [https://perma.cc/87NE-J4GS]. In December 2020, Uber
sold its self-driving car unit to Aurora Innovation, a startup backed in part by Amazon.
Kirsten Korosec, Uber Sells Self-Driving Unit Uber ATG in Deal that Will Push Aurora’s
Valuation to $10B, TECHCRUNCH (Dec. 7, 2020, 2:05 PM), https://techcrunch.com/2020/12/07/
uber-sells-self-driving-unit-uber-atg-in-deal-that-will-push-auroras-valuation-to-10b/
[https://perma.cc/A6TG-MU9M].
214. See Allen, supra note 20, at 294.
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application and not “a provider of transportation, logistics or de-
livery services or as a transportation carrier.”215
Airbnb is another example of a sharing economy platform that
plays an active role in for-profit transactions while attempting to
use section 230 as a broad liability shield. Airbnb is a home-sharing
platform that allows people to rent out rooms or entire dwellings to
others.216 It does not charge users to list or find rentals on its
website.217 But once a booking is made, Airbnb charges guests
directly and then pays the host, typically “about 24 hours after the
guest is scheduled to arrive.”218 While hosts set their own prices,
Airbnb offers “[t]rusted pricing advice” that is designed to match
prices to local demands.219 Additionally, Airbnb allows users to
charge additional fees for services or extra guests.220 It offers free
property damage protection and liability insurance to hosts, along
with customer support and the ability to set house rules.221 Finally,
Airbnb charges a general service fee of 3-5 percent for booked
reservations.222
Airbnb has attempted to use section 230 immunity as a shield
against state and local attempts to regulate its operations. Local
municipalities have struggled with regulating short-term rentals,
215. U.S. Terms of Use, supra note 18 (emphasis omitted).
216. About Us, AIRBNB NEWSROOM, https://press.airbnb.com/about-us/ [https://perma.cc/
NX56-2CF6]. Airbnb touts itself as “[a]n economic empowerment engine” that “has helped
millions of hospitality entrepreneurs monetize their spaces and their passions while keeping
the financial benefits of tourism in their own communities.” Id. It claims seven million listings
in over two hundred countries and one hundred thousand cities. Id.





221. Earn Money as an Airbnb Host, AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/host/homes
[https://perma.cc/A289-VHU4].
222. See How You Make Money on Airbnb, supra note 217; see also How Does Occupancy
Tax Collection and Remittance by Airbnb Work?, AIRBNB HELP CTR., https://www.airbnb.com/
help/article/1036/how-does-occupancy-tax-collection-and-remittance-by-airbnb-work
[https://perma.cc/KCM9-7GBK] (“We automatically collect and pay occupancy taxes on behalf
of hosts whenever a guest pays for a booking in specific jurisdictions. Hosts may need to
manually collect occupancy taxes in other jurisdictions and in certain listed jurisdictions
where Airbnb does not collect all applicable occupancy taxes.”); What Is VAT and How Does
It Apply to Me?, AIRBNB HELPCTR., https://www.airbnb.com/help/article/436/what-is-vat-and-
how-does-it-apply-to-me [https://perma.cc/ARS5-UDUJ] (listing the areas where Airbnb
charges a value added tax).
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which have boomed ever since homesharing platforms came into
existence.223 San Francisco is a notable jurisdiction that has passed
ordinances requiring licensure and registration for short-term
rentals.224 These conditions include registration with the city in
advance, proof of liability insurance, payment of taxes, reporting of
usage, and compliance with municipal codes.225 The city also man-
dated that web platforms that host short-term rental listings must
inform hosts of the applicable law.226 Most notably, citing a lack of
enforcement and compliance, the city took aim at “booking services,”
such as Airbnb, that facilitate illegal rentals. In a June 2016
ordinance,227 the city attempted to force booking services to police
listings and avoid publishing illegal short-term rental offers.228
Airbnb sued, seeking a preliminary injunction blocking enforcement
of the ordinance.229 In response, the city obtained a stay and
amended the ordinance to remove restrictions on platforms
223. See, e.g., Stephen R. Miller, First Principles for Regulating the Sharing Economy, 53
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 147, 158-59 (2016) (discussing the benefits of the sharing economy for
urban development in cities and other economic benefits to local regions). Notably, the sharing
economy largely operates outside of existing regulations by explicitly violating local
regulations that govern hotels or other industries. Id. at 153. The hotel industry and other
traditional economic actors may be complying with industry regulations that sharing economy
actors, such as Airbnb, are circumventing. See id. at 160-62. Regulatory reactions are varied
among governing bodies, from attempts at all-out bans to little or no regulation at all. See id.
at 185-87. One approach is to require licenses or permits, usually at a fee, as a means for
collecting information and for limiting the negative effects of short-term rentals. Id. at 187.
Registries are another aspect of short-term rental regulation that allow for information
gathering and monitoring. See id. at 188.
224. Id. at 188 (citing S.F.,CAL.,ADMIN.CODE § 41A.5(g)(3)(A) (2015)); see also Airbnb, Inc.
v. City & County of San Francisco, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1066, 1069-70 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (citing S.F.,
Cal., Ordinance 218-14 (Oct. 27, 2014)).
225. Airbnb, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1070.
226. Miller, supra note 223, at 189.
227. The ordinance defined “booking service” as “any reservation and/or payment service
provided by a person or entity that facilitates a short-term rental transaction between an
Owner ... and a prospective tourist or transient user ... for which the person or entity collects
or receives ... a fee in connection with the reservation and/or payment services.” Airbnb, 217
F. Supp. 3d at 1071 (alterations in original) (quoting S.F., Cal., Ordinance 178-16 (Aug. 11,
2016)). The court explained that, under the ordinance, booking services were not meant to be
limited to internet platforms and could encompass any person or entity that participated in
the short-term rental business by collecting booking service fees. Id. (defining the ordinance’s
term “[h]osting [p]latform”). The court noted that the “[b]ooking [s]ervice terms and provisions
[were] at the heart of plaintiffs’ lawsuit.” Id.
228. Id. at 1070.
229. Id.
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publishing illegal listings, but it made it a misdemeanor for plat-
forms to collect a fee for rental of an unregistered unit.230
Despite the amendment, Airbnb and HomeAway.com, another
homesharing platform, still sought to enjoin the ordinance’s
enforcement, alleging that it was preempted by section 230.231 The
court analyzed the scope of section 230 and held that the platforms
were “interactive computer service[s]” that host third-party
content.232 But the court also analyzed whether the ordinance
sought to treat the platforms as the publishers or speakers of
another’s content.233 According to the platforms, the ordinance
treated the platforms as publishers because it, in essence, threat-
ened “criminal penalty for providing and receiving a fee for
[b]ooking [s]ervices for an unregistered unit” which thus “require[d]
that they actively monitor and police listings by third parties to
verify registration.”234 The court rejected this concern, noting that
the ordinance did “not regulate what can or cannot be said or posted
in the listings. It creates no obligation on plaintiffs’ part to monitor,
edit, withdraw or block the content supplied by hosts.”235 Instead,
the court noted that the ordinance placed no limits on what the
platforms allowed or did not allow to be posted.236 Further, the
liability under the ordinance arose out of the platforms’ collection of
a booking fee for an unregistered listing, which was the platforms’
own conduct and activity.237 The court distinguished several cases
in which section 230 was applied broadly, noting that all of those
cases involved publishing activity by the platform.238 Ultimately, the
court held that the test for section 230 immunity “is not whether a
challenged activity merely bears some connection to online
230. Id. at 1071.
231. Id.




236. Id. at 1072-73.
237. Id. at 1073.
238. Id. at 1073-74. For example, the opinion noted that another trial court in the Ninth
Circuit held that a state law’s criminalization of the publication of sex-trafficking
advertisements by third parties did implicate section 230 immunity. Id. at 1073 (citing
Backpage.com, LLC v. McKenna, 881 F. Supp. 2d 1262, 1266-68, 1273 (W.D. Wash. 2012)).
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content.”239 Instead, the test is whether the activity “turn[s] on
holding an Internet service liable for posting or failing to remove
content provided by a third party.”240
The Ninth Circuit reached a similar result in HomeAway.com,
Inc. v. City of Santa Monica.241 The court affirmed a decision
rejecting section 230 immunity for homesharing platforms challeng-
ing a local ordinance that sought to curtail unlawful rental
listings.242 The ordinance prohibited rental agreements for durations
shorter than thirty days, except when the owner also lived on
premises or when the unit was a city-licensed homeshare.243 The
statute additionally imposed obligations on homesharing platforms,
such as collecting and remitting an occupancy tax, regularly
disclosing booking and listing information to the city, refraining
from booking unlicensed properties through the platform, and
refraining from collecting other fees from unlicensed properties.244
Platforms that complied with these obligations could benefit from a
safe harbor that presumes compliance with the law or otherwise
face fines or other punishment.245
The platforms in City of Santa Monica argued that they were
publishers of third-party content and were thus immune under
section 230 from the obligations imposed by the ordinance for two
reasons. First, they argued that the ordinance implicated section
230 immunity because it mandated that platforms “monitor the
content of a third-party listing and compare it against the [c]ity’s
short-term rental registry.”246 Second, they argued that the ordi-
nance forced the platforms “to remove third-party content.”247
239. Id. at 1074.
240. Id. The court also rejected the platforms’ arguments that section 230 analysis must
look at the “practical effect” of the law and “how it operates in fact” rather than what the
ordinance says on its face. Id. at 1074-75 (internal quotations omitted). The fact that
platforms may voluntarily remove postings for unregistered units does not mean the ordi-
nance runs afoul of section 230 immunity. Id. at 1075. The court held that section 230
immunity was improper because the ordinance neither treated the platforms as publishers
or speakers, nor forced them to edit or remove third-party content. Id.
241. See 918 F.3d 676 (9th Cir. 2019).
242. See id. at 679-80.
243. Id. at 680.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Id. at 682.
247. Id. at 683 (emphasis omitted).
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The Ninth Circuit rejected both arguments. First, the court
acknowledged that section 230 provides broad immunity from state-
law claims, even outside of the defamation context.248 But the court
noted that the basis for liability under the ordinance does not rely
on the platform’s role as “publisher or speaker” of third-party
content.249 Instead, the court stated that it must look at the duty
imposed and whether it “would necessarily require an internet
company to monitor third-party content.”250 The ordinance limited
the platforms’ ability to process transactions and required monitor-
ing of listings, which the court noted resulted from the third-party
listings but did not rise to the level of reaching publication activi-
ties.251 The court stated that section 230 immunity cannot be so
broadly construed as to apply to any situation in which “a website
uses data initially obtained from third parties.”252
Further, the court held that the ordinance did not require the
platforms to remove third-party content.253 Rather, the platforms
could choose to keep “un-bookable listings” on the website, even
though it would have been useless to do so.254 Thus, the court held
that “the [o]rdinance does not proscribe, mandate, or even discuss
the content of the listings that the [p]latforms display on their
websites.”255 The court noted that section 230 does not “magically”
make otherwise illegal conduct lawful simply because it happens
online.256 Rather, platforms have to comply with myriad state and
local regulations just like brick-and-mortar companies, even though
compliance is a burden on businesses.257 Because the ordinance did
not impose liability for the content of bookings, the court held that
section 230 immunity did not apply.258
248. Id. at 684.
249. See id. at 681.
250. Id. at 682.
251. Id. The court noted that the ordinance’s monitoring and reporting requirements
simply required platforms to cross-reference posts and comply with a tax regulation, which
did not implicate editorial or publication functions. Id.
252. Id. (quoting Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1100 (9th Cir. 2009)).
253. Id. at 683.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Id. (quoting Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521
F.3d 1157, 1164 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc)).
257. Id.
258. Id. at 684.
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In both the San Francisco and Santa Monica cases, the courts
denied section 230 immunity but never held that Airbnb was an
“information content provider.” Instead, they held that the conduct
in question did not implicate publication activities, thereby making
section 230 inapplicable.259 But in La Park La Brea A LLC v. Airbnb,
Inc., the court expressly held section 230 applied to Airbnb as an
“interactive computer service.”260 There, a landlord sued Airbnb for
its role in brokering unlawful subleases on its properties.261 The
court dismissed the claim, noting that “Airbnb hosts—not Airbnb—
are responsible for providing the actual listing information. Airbnb
‘merely provide[s] a framework that could be utilized for proper or
improper purposes.’”262 The court further noted that Airbnb was not
a content provider “because no [listing] has any content until a user
actively creates it.”263 Therefore, sharing economy platforms such as
Airbnb will likely continue to assert broad section 230 immunity to
disclaim all liability for the transactions they facilitate.
But Uber, Airbnb, and other platforms have evolved beyond the
role of interactive computer services that “access software
provider[s] that provide[ ] or enable[ ] computer access by multiple
users to a computer server.”264 While Uber and Airbnb both allow
user reviews, ratings, and comments, they also provide the structure
and profit from individual transactions. This functionality moves far
beyond an intermediary role and crosses over into a joint enterprise
259. Id. at 686; Airbnb, Inc. v. City & County of San Francisco, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1066, 1079
(N.D. Cal. 2016).
260. 285 F. Supp. 3d 1097, 1108 (C.D. Cal. 2017).
261. Id. at 1102.
262. Id. at 1105 (alteration in original) (quoting Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley
v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1172 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc)).
263. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119,
1124 (9th Cir. 2013)). The PLAN Act sought to carve platforms such as Airbnb out of section
230 immunity. Protecting Local Authority and Neighborhoods Act, H.R. 4232, 116th Cong.
(2019); see also Eric Goldman, The PLAN Act Proposes to Amend Section 230 to “Protect” ...
Landlords and Hotel Chains?, TECH. & MKTG. L. BLOG (Oct. 16, 2019), https://
blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2019/10/the-plan-act-proposes-to-amend-section-230-to-protect-
landlords-and-hotel-chains.htm [https://perma.cc/6KFJ-E2K5] (noting that the PLAN Act
would reverse the outcome in future cases resembling La Park La Brea).
264. 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(2) (defining “interactive computer service” as “any information
service, system, or access software provider that provides or enables computer access by mul-
tiple users to a computer server, including specifically a service or system that provides access
to the Internet and such systems operated or services offered by libraries or educational
institutions”).
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based on the platform’s hands-on involvement in providing services
to users. Thus, modern platforms, and particularly sharing-economy
platforms, may not fit neatly into section 230’s computer service/
content provider definition. Instead, a joint enterprise liability ap-
proach may help identify instances when a platform crosses over
into the realm of being an information content provider.265 This joint
enterprise framework is instructive for identifying the nature of the
platform’s relationship to its users and whether section 230
immunity is appropriate.
b. Online Marketplaces
An emerging area testing the limits of section 230 is products
liability in online marketplaces. Historically, the case law has
established that section 230 immunity can apply to online auction
sites.266 For example, in Gentry v. eBay, Inc., an online marketplace
did not fit the definition of a “dealer” under state laws regulating
certain transactions and was immune under section 230.267 The
Gentry plaintiffs purchased counterfeit sports memorabilia through
eBay.268 They alleged that eBay violated a California statute that
required sellers of autographed sports memorabilia to require or
provide a valid certificate of authenticity to purchasers.269 The
plaintiff also asserted other claims including negligence, unfair
business practices, and misrepresentation.270
eBay is an online marketplace that allows users to sell goods via
auction or for a fixed price.271 It charges fees to dealers for listing
265. See id. § 230(f)(3) (defining “information content provider” as “any person or entity
that is responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or development of information
provided through the Internet or any other interactive computer service”).
266. See, e.g., Gentry v. eBay, Inc., 121 Cal. Rptr. 2d 703, 706 (Ct. App. 2002); Stoner v.
eBay, Inc., No. 305666, 2000 WL 1705637, at *1 (Cal. Super. Ct. Nov. 1, 2000) (holding that
section 230 precluded liability for bootleg items sold on the company’s website); Hinton v.
Amazon.com, LLC, 72 F. Supp. 3d 685, 687 (S.D. Miss. 2014) (defective hunting equipment);
Inman v. Technicolor USA, Inc., No. 11-666, 2011 WL 5829024, at *6 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 18, 2011)
(mercury-laden vacuum tubes).




271. Id. at 707.
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auction items and charges percentage fees when items are sold.272
Additionally, it provides a forum for customer feedback, which may
include endorsements from eBay based on a dealer’s performance on
the website.273 Further, eBay sets the categories and general section
descriptions for its “sports memorabilia” listings.274 The Gentry
plaintiffs noted that eBay gave consumers a sense of trust in the
authenticity of items listed in its “sports memorabilia” categories
and that eBay ignored consumer complaints and warnings from
governmental agencies about forged sports memorabilia being sold
on the website.275 eBay, on the other hand, argued that it was not a
“dealer” under the California statute and that section 230 immu-
nized it from liability.276 The court agreed with eBay, holding that
it was not a seller and that it merely provided an online venue for
third-party dealers.277 Additionally, the court held that section 230
immunity preempted the plaintiffs’ claims.278
In applying section 230 immunity, the Gentry court noted that the
statute applies beyond defamation claims and can bar other tort
causes of action.279 Relying on Zeran, the court reiterated that




276. Id. at 709. Under the California statute,
[w]henever a dealer, in selling or offering to sell to a consumer a collectible in or
from this state, provides a description of that collectible as being autographed,
the dealer shall furnish a certificate of authenticity to the consumer at the time
of sale. The certificate of authenticity shall be in writing, shall be signed by the
dealer or his or her authorized agent, and shall specify the date of sale.
Id. at 711 (quoting CAL. CIV. CODE § 1739.7(b)). The statute defined a “dealer” as
a person who is in the business of selling or offering for sale collectibles in or
from this state, exclusively or nonexclusively, or a person who by his or her
occupation holds himself or herself out as having knowledge or skill peculiar to
collectibles, or to whom that knowledge or skill may be attributed by his or her
employment of an agent or other intermediary that by his or her occupation
holds himself or herself out as having that knowledge or skill. “Dealer” includes
an auctioneer who sells collectibles at a public auction, and also includes persons
who are consignors or representatives or agents of auctioneers. “Dealer” includes
a person engaged in a mail order, telephone order, or cable television business
for the sale of collectibles.
Id. at 711 (quoting CAL. CIV. CODE § 1739.7(a)(4)).
277. Id. at 711.
278. Id. at 712.
279. Id. at 714.
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interactive computer services shall not be treated as “publishers” of
third-party content that appears on their websites.280 The court
rejected the plaintiffs’ arguments that eBay had an independent
duty to “furnish a warranty” as a provider of descriptions of goods,
not as a publisher.281 Rather, the court held that the claims
“ultimately s[ought] to hold eBay responsible for ... eBay’s dissemi-
nation of representations made by the individual defendants, or the
posting of compilations of information generated by those defen-
dants and other third parties.”282 This, the court held, fell squarely
within section 230’s prohibition on treating interactive computer
services as “publishers.”283
But even in offline examples, auctioneers are not subject to
products liability claims as “sellers” because the auctioneer’s role is
clearly different than that of the third-party owner for which the
auctioneer is merely an agent facilitating a sale.284 Thus, applying
section 230 immunity to online auction sites such as eBay follows a
similar rationale.
Other online marketplaces, however, blur the lines between seller
and intermediary. Amazon, for example, sells its own products
interspersed with third-party products from an Amazon warehouse,
with all correspondence and payment handled through Amazon.285
This complicates the section 230 and products liability analysis.
For example, in Oberdorf v. Amazon.com Inc., the Third Circuit
scrutinized Amazon’s role in third-party vendor transactions under
state products liability laws and held that section 230 did not
immunize the company as a “seller” of a defective dog leash.286 First,
the court examined Amazon’s role in the transaction.287 Amazon, as
an online marketplace, sells its own products and those listed by
280. Id. at 713-14 (citing Zeran v. America Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997)).
281. Id. at 715.
282. Id.
283. Id. (citing 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1)).
284. See AMERICAN LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 5:27, Westlaw (database updated Aug.
2020) (noting how products liability laws do not apply to auctioneers because they are not
“sellers”).
285. Oberdorf v. Amazon.com Inc., 930 F.3d 136, 140-41 (3d Cir. 2019), reh’g en banc
granted, opinion vacated, 936 F.3d 182 (3d Cir. 2019), and certifying questions to 818 F. App’x
138 (3d Cir. 2020).
286. Id. at 140, 153.
287. Id. at 140.
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third-party vendors.288 It lists third-party products, collects order
information, and processes payments in exchange for a fee from the
vendor.289 Amazon also prohibits the sale of certain products, such
as those that it deems illegal, obscene, or defamatory.290 Vendors
must agree to Amazon’s service agreement, which gives Amazon the
“sole discretion to determine the content, appearance, design,
functionality, and all other aspects” of the product’s listing on
Amazon’s website.291 Notably, the company “also offers a ‘Fulfill-
ment by Amazon’ service, in which it takes physical possession of
third-party vendors’ products and ships those products to consum-
ers. Otherwise, the vendor itself is responsible for shipping products
directly to consumers.”292 Amazon’s service agreement also gives
vendors the power to choose their own pricing, with the caveat that
they may not list a product on Amazon at a higher price than on
other sales channels.293 In analyzing Amazon’s business structure
with its third-party vendors, the Oberdorf court noted that Amazon
“exerts substantial market control over product sales by restricting
product pricing, customer service, and communications with
customers.”294
The product at issue in Oberdorf was a retractable dog collar that
the plaintiff purchased on Amazon’s website from a third-party
vendor.295 The plaintiff used the collar on her own dog and, a few
weeks after purchase, the collar’s D-ring broke and the retractable
leash hit the plaintiff in the face, causing permanent blindness in
her left eye.296 The plaintiff sued Amazon alleging products liability
based on failure to warn and design defect under Pennsylvania
law.297 The lower court granted summary judgment for Amazon,
holding that it was not a “seller” under Pennsylvania’s strict
products liability law and that it was immune under section 230
288. Id. at 140-41.
289. Id. Amazon’s fees can take several forms. Id.




294. Id. at 149.
295. Id. at 142.
296. Id.
297. Id. at 142-43. Neither Amazon nor the plaintiff could locate the third-party vendor,
which was no longer active on Amazon. Id. at 142.
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because the plaintiff sought to hold Amazon liable for publishing
third-party content.298
First, as to whether Amazon was a seller, the appellate court
analyzed the factors for determining what constitutes a “seller”
under Pennsylvania law and held that Amazon could fit the
definition.299 The court emphasized that Amazon only allowed third-
party vendors to communicate to customers through its platform
and that it did nothing to ensure its third-party vendors were in
good standing or amenable to suit in the United States.300 Further,
the court explained that imposing liability on Amazon would
incentivize greater safety given the degree of control that the
company exerts on its third-party vendors.301 Finally, Amazon was
in a unique position to discourage the sale of defective products, to
manage complaints about those products, and to bear the costs of
compensating injury victims.302 Thus, the court held that Amazon
could be a “seller” under Pennsylvania products liability law.303
Second, the Oberdorf court held that section 230 did not immu-
nize Amazon from all claims.304 The plaintiff argued that she was
seeking to hold Amazon liable for its role in selling and distributing
a defective product, not for its role in publishing a third-party
vendor’s listing.305 The plaintiff also asserted failure to warn claims
because Amazon failed to revise the post to warn of the product’s
298. Id. at 143.
299. Id. at 143-44. The court articulated four factors:
(1) Whether the actor is the “only member of the marketing chain available to
the injured plaintiff for redress”;
(2) Whether “imposition of strict liability upon the [actor] serves as an incentive
to safety”;
(3) Whether the actor is “in a better position than the consumer to prevent the
circulation of defective products”; and
(4) Whether “[t]he [actor] can distribute the cost of compensating for injuries
resulting from defects by charging for it in his business, i.e., by adjustment of
the rental terms.”
Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Musser v. Vilsmeier Auction Co., Inc., 562 A.2d 279, 282
(Pa. 1989)).
300. Id. at 145.
301. Id. at 145-46.
302. Id. at 146-47.
303. Id. at 147-48.
304. Id. at 151.
305. Id. at 152.
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danger.306 The court held that section 230 immunized Amazon from
the failure to warn claims, as these involve “the publisher’s editorial
function.”307 But the appellate court vacated the lower court’s
dismissal of the design defect claims on section 230 grounds.308 The
court held that the design defect “claims rely on allegations relating
to selling, inspecting, marketing, distributing, failing to test, or
designing” a product.309 Thus, Amazon played a direct role as seller
and distributor and could not rely on section 230 immunity.310
Notably, the Third Circuit, sitting en banc, vacated the panel’s
ruling in Oberdorf and the case was reargued.311 In June 2020, the
Third Circuit announced that it was unable to “discern if and how”
section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts “applies to
Amazon” and thus certified the question to the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court.312 However, other courts have also concluded that
Amazon is not immune under section 230 for defective products. In
Erie Insurance Co. v. Amazon.com Inc., the Fourth Circuit held that
Amazon was not immune under section 230(c)(1) in a products
liability case relating to an LED-headlamp that caused a fire.313 The
plaintiff purchased the headlamp from a third-party seller, and
Amazon “fulfill[ed]” the order.314 Reviewing a grant of Amazon’s
motion for summary judgment, the appellate court held that section
230 is triggered only when a platform’s potential liability is based
on the platform’s publication of third-party speech.315 For products
liability claims, the basis of liability is a defendant’s role as seller
and not as publisher.316 Thus, the appellate court reversed the trial
court and held that section 230 did not provide immunity to
Amazon.317 However, the appellate court also held that Amazon did
306. Id.




311. Oberdorf v. Amazon.com Inc., 936 F.3d 182 (3d Cir. 2019) (en banc) (mem.).
312. See Oberdorf v. Amazon.com Inc., 818 F. App’x 138, 143 (3d Cir. 2020) (en banc).
313. 925 F.3d 135, 137 (4th Cir. 2019).
314. Id. “Fulfillment by Amazon” means that the third-party seller uses Amazon’s ware-
house for storage and relies on Amazon to receive orders, collect payments, and ship
merchandise. Id. at 138.
315. Id. at 139.
316. Id.
317. Id. at 140.
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not fit the state’s definition of “seller” and ultimately was not
liable.318
Notably, in Bolger v. Amazon.com, LLC, a California appellate
court allowed products liability claims to go forward against
Amazon after a defective laptop battery exploded, causing severe
burns.319 The battery was sold by third-party foreign seller Lenoge
Technology on Amazon’s platform, and the court held that Amazon
could be liable under strict products liability because of its role in
the transaction:
Amazon placed itself between Lenoge [the third-party seller] and
Bolger [the consumer] in the chain of distribution of the product
at issue here. Amazon accepted possession of the product from
Lenoge, stored it in an Amazon warehouse, attracted Bolger to
the Amazon website, provided her with a product listing for
Lenoge’s product, received her payment for the product, and
shipped the product in Amazon packaging to her. Amazon set
the terms of its relationship with Lenoge, controlled the condi-
tions of Lenoge’s offer for sale on Amazon, limited Lenoge’s
access to Amazon’s customer information, forced Lenoge to
communicate with customers through Amazon, and demanded
indemnification as well as substantial fees on each purchase.
Whatever term we use to describe Amazon’s role, be it “retailer,”
“distributor,” or merely “facilitator,” it was pivotal in bringing
the product here to the consumer.320
318. Id. at 144. Maryland requires that the product defect be attributable to the seller. Id.
at 140. The defect must have existed at the time of sale when it left the seller. Id. The court
looked to the dictionary and the commercial code to conclude that a seller is someone who
transfers title to property or otherwise has ownership of the property it is selling. Id. at 141.
Because Amazon never “transfer[red] title to purchasers of that property for a price” when it
took on the “fulfillment services” role, it was not liable as the “seller” of the headlamp. See id.;
cf. Fox v. Amazon.com, Inc., 930 F.3d 415, 425 (6th Cir. 2019) (reversing grant of summary
judgment in part in a hoverboard fire case because Amazon had a duty to warn the plaintiff
but ultimately affirming summary judgment on the grounds that Amazon was not a seller in
this instance). But see Love v. Weecoo (TM), 774 F. App’x 519, 520-22 (11th Cir. 2019) (re-
versing dismissal of a products liability claim regarding a hoverboard that caused a house fire
because plaintiff sufficiently alleged Amazon had actual or constructive knowledge of the
defect).
319. 267 Cal. Rptr. 3d 601, 604 (Ct. App. 2020), petition for review denied, S264607, 2020
Cal. LEXIS 7993 (Cal. Nov. 18, 2020).
320. Id. at 604-05.
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Relying on the policy rationales that support strict liability—
including making products safer, protecting consumers, and
allocating costs to defendants—the court noted that products
liability applies to parties involved in the chain of distribution that
are “an integral part of the overall producing and marketing
enterprise.”321 Amazon acted as an intermediary that went so far as
to possess the product and fill customer orders directly.322
The Bolger court also rejected Amazon’s argument that section
230 immunized it from liability.323 The product liability claims
against Amazon did not arise from Amazon’s publication of third-
party speech, such as the content of the product listing, but from
Amazon’s role in the transaction itself.324
These cases demonstrate that section 230 immunity may cease
when the platform’s role extends beyond hosting third-party
listings. As online marketplaces morph into hands-on partners of
third-party vendors, they may face liability as “sellers” of products
under state products liability laws. But rather than focusing on
whether the claim arises out of publication of third-party content,
a joint enterprise liability theory helps provide a consistent and
principled approach to help inform this analysis.
C. Platform as Joint Enterprise
Under a joint enterprise liability framework, the appropriateness
and scope of platform immunity can be determined by the specific
relationship between the platform and third party as to the unique
conduct giving rise to liability. In the section 230 context, joint
enterprises are more akin to information content providers than
interactive computer services and should be subject to liability.
While this framework will result in broader liability for some
internet platforms, it will preserve section 230’s important role in
321. Id. at 613 (quoting Arriaga v. CitiCapital Com. Corp., 85 Cal. Rptr. 3d 143 (Ct. App.
2008)).
322. Id. at 614.
323. Id. at 626 (citing Erie Ins. Co. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 925 F.3d 135, 139-40 (4th Cir.
2019)).
324. Id. at 626-27. The Court rejected Amazon’s contention that it was akin to the online
auction website in Gentry v. eBay, noting that the Gentry case sounded in negligence, not
strict liability, and hinged on third-party statements posted in an online product listing. Id.
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insulating online intermediaries from liability arising out of third-
party speech while allowing some remedies for those harmed in the
platform economy.
The joint enterprise liability framework should consider the
platform’s economic activity and involvement in transactions. Take,
for example, a social media platform and its individual users. While
the platform encourages users to post content, filters content with
algorithmic tools, and removes content based on its own internal
procedures, these facts alone likely do not amount to a joint
enterprise. The user and platform likely lack a common purpose, as
the platform is interested in maximizing user engagement or
collecting user data while the user is interested in maintaining and
building social relationships.325
By contrast, a sharing economy platform that goes beyond merely
listing third-party services may be deemed a joint enterprise. For
some transactions, sharing economy platforms act like a joint
venture with the third party by exerting sufficient control over the
transaction and sharing a common pecuniary interest, among other
factors.326 When a common pecuniary interest and right of control
exist, section 230 should not insulate the platform from liability
arising out of the transaction or venture.
Uber, for example, functions as a transportation service that
relies on third parties to use their own resources (cars) to deliver the
service (giving customers rides). Uber’s structure and involvement
in each underlying transaction may support joint enterprise
liability. In this scenario, Uber is not a speaker or publisher of
third-party content but instead is acting as a joint venturer. Thus,
section 230 immunity should not apply. Airbnb and other
homesharing platforms may also fit the role of joint enterprise for
the purposes of section 230 immunity given their specific involve-
ment in the services the platform offers.
At the same time, however, if Uber or Airbnb is sued because a
user defamed someone in a review, the platforms refused to remove
325. See TIM WU, THE ATTENTION MERCHANTS: THE EPIC SCRAMBLE TO GET INSIDE OUR
HEADS 6 (2016); Andrew Keen, The ‘Attention Economy’ Created by Silicon Valley Is Bank-
rupting Us, TECHCRUNCH (July 30, 2017, 6:30 PM), https://techcrunch.com/2017/07/30/the-
attention-economy-created-by-silicon-valley-is-bankrupting-us/ [https://perma.cc/YZB4-QQ94].
326. A “joint enterprise” in tort law often includes a common pecuniary purpose and right
of control. See supra note 160 and accompanying text.
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a comment, or the platform chose to moderate comments made by
platform users, section 230 would still apply. The key is the specific
role of the platform in the post or transaction giving rise to liability.
Even sharing economy platforms should retain immunity when the
basis of liability arises out of third-party speech. It is only in the
context of platform-as-joint-enterprise that section 230 immunity
would no longer apply.
Similarly, in the online marketplace context, platforms that host
third-party content and act as intermediaries for the sale of goods
are not necessarily a joint enterprise so as to lose section 230
immunity. But the more “hands on” the role the platform takes in
the underlying transaction—including a shared pecuniary interest
and equal right of control—the less appropriate section 230
immunity becomes. Thus, Amazon’s role in the sale of the dog leash
in Oberdorf or the headlamp in Erie may be sufficient to find a joint
enterprise. In such cases, Amazon should not be entitled to section
230 immunity from products liability claims.
Together, these examples show how joint enterprise liability can
be a helpful lens through which to define the bounds of platform
immunity under section 230. A joint enterprise framework provides
a method of discerning between online intermediaries hosting third-
party content and platforms that are engaging in a for-profit
venture with a third party sufficient to defeat platform immunity.
A joint enterprise approach does not foreclose other solutions for
redefining section 230 immunity, but it can help define the bounds
of immunity in cases that seek to extend its protections too far. In
sum, the joint enterprise liability framework homes in on those
platforms that engage in a specific for-profit relationship with the
third party that then causes harm to a victim, in which liability may
be justified, and broad immunity is not warranted.
CONCLUSION
Over the last two decades, scholars, judges, and legislatures have
identified some bases for limiting the broad immunity afforded by
section 230. The concerns and rationales underlying section 230
have also evolved. The internet is no longer in its infancy. Human
and corporate activity are no longer divided neatly into online and
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real-world conduct. Modern internet platforms bear little resem-
blance to the limited functionality of the 1990s internet. Cases that
involve section 230 immunity in the sharing economy platform and
online marketplace contexts demonstrate the need to redefine
section 230’s bounds. Platform immunity has become a source of
unfairness with its high bar to recovery, and well-reasoned reforms
can promote fairness to plaintiffs. The crucial question then is how
we preserve the benefits of section 230 and its laudable free speech
and free market objectives while reining in overbroad applications
of platform immunity.
Given the ways in which modern platforms have evolved, a
sounder approach to determining section 230 immunity is to look at
the core economic relationship between platform and user. Joint
enterprise theory in tort law already provides a framework for doing
so, allowing for liability to attach only when pecuniary interests
align and sufficient control exists. By moving section 230 into a joint
enterprise framework, meaningful limits to immunity can be
created without frustrating section 230’s core functionality and
purpose.
